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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to provide insight from the internal auditor’s perspective on 
whether the control environment has an influence on the possibility of internal auditors to detect fraud.   
Methodology: For this paper we use a quantitative research with a deductive method approach.  
Theoretical perspective: Main theories in this paper consist of role theory, triangle theory, and agency 
theory. 
Empirical foundation: The primary data collection consists of information from a web-based 
questionnaire sent to members of the Institute of Internal Auditor in the US. 
Conclusions: There is no correlation between internal control environment and possibility of internal 
auditors in detecting fraud. This research tries to find out if there is any correlation between the years of 
experience of internal auditors and the perception of possibility in detecting fraud and if there is any 
correlation between the perception of internal auditors in their role and the perception of possibility in 
detecting fraud, however, the answers for both these concerns is that there is no correlation.  
There is no significant difference in opinion about which factor is important in influencing the possibility 
of detecting fraud amongst internal auditors who have different years of experience. Similarly, there is no 
significant difference in opinion about which factor is important in influencing the possibility of detecting 
fraud amongst internal auditors who have different perception of their role in connection with detecting 
fraud having 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
The concept of auditing has been around for many years.  There are traces of some form of auditing 
dating back to the Roman Empire times. According to Adelberg, referenced in Gupta and Ray (1992, pp. 
3), it was between the sixteenth and eighteenth century in which the detection and prevention of fraud 
became the internal auditor’s main objective (Gupta & Ray, 1992). However, Picket (2004) claims that 
internal auditors were viewed as a mechanism to double check hundreds of transactions posted to the 
accounts on a weekly basis until the 1950’s and 1960’s when the internal auditor role changed to 
conducting basic tests of the accounts with the objective of detecting errors and irregularities (Pickett, 
2004).  
The internal auditor’s role has evolved into being an advisor to management in implementing better 
controls and having high-level input in the risk strategies of the company (Pickett, 2004). In agreement 
with Pickett (2004), a review, by Gupta and Ray (1992), of several Professional Standard Bulletin issued 
by the IIA indicated that internal auditors investigate and detect fraud as well as evaluate internal and 
organizational controls. Furthermore, internal auditors provide advice on future actions based on analysis, 
have constant communication with the board, and work with the external auditors (Gupta & Ray, 1992).  
The internal auditor determines if the plans and activities of the organization are being executed in an 
economical, efficient, and effective way; they provide an opinion on whether the objectives of the firm 
are being met (Gupta & Ray, 1992). Due to the various corporate fraud scandals in the early 2000’s the 
role of the internal auditor saw an increase in responsibilities with the implementation of Section 404 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; one of these responsibilities included internal auditors helping firms comply 
with the assessment and reporting of internal controls required under this sections (E&Y, 2011).  
SOX increased organizations’ need to use COSO’s framework in order to develop and effectively assess 
internal controls (Moeller, 2004). Although using COSO’s framework is not mandatory, most companies 
use this framework since according to Moeller (2004) the COSO framework helps firms build a strong 
system of internal financial system controls. Despite the fact that SOX was implemented to increase the 
responsibility of management and external auditors to detect fraud, this regulation and the COSO 
framework has also indirectly influenced the responsibility of the internal auditor when detecting fraud. 
1.2 Research Problem 
There are people who question the effectiveness of audits. Powers (1999) provides his skepticism on the 
auditing function, both internal and external auditing, as he describes auditing as simply ‘rationalized 
rituals’ used to create organizational legitimacy. He argues that auditors have increased their focus on 
making sure that the controls or auditable as oppose of verifying that they are effective (Power , 1999). In 
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addition, due to various high levels corporate scandals, fraud prevention and detection within 
organizations have received more attention than ever before, resulting in fraud mechanisms, such as the 
external and internal auditors, often being criticized for their incapability of detecting fraud in several 
major scandals.  
In specific, the internal audit function has often received criticism due to its independency issue. Internal 
auditors are internal staff of organization, which are paid and strongly affected by the organization. As 
Epstein and Geiger (1994) state the internal auditor could be a better fraud mechanism, but because of the 
independence issue they are unable to prove themselves (Epstein & Geiger, 1994). The independency of 
the internal auditor can be compromised due to their consultancy role since management will see the 
internal auditor as a part of their department (Kawashima, 2007).  Nickell and Roberts (2012) argue that 
the internal auditor works within a weak autonomy since they are exposed to organization politics, which 
could influence their performance (Nickell & Roberts, 2012). A report published in 2010 by Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiners shows that the internal audit function is not the most effective method for 
detecting fraud; from 1,001 frauds cases only 13.7 percent were detected by internal auditors ranking 
third in methods to detect fraud from these 1,001 cases (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2010). 
According to the report, 37.8 percent from the cases were discovered by tips and 17.1% from 
management review (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2010). 
However, there are people who argue that the internal auditors could prove to be better fraud mechanism 
when compared to the external auditor. In addition, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners found 
that the internal auditors discovered 13.7 percent of reported fraud cases, while external auditors only 
discovered 4.2% making it the 7th method that detected fraud from the 1,001 cases (Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, 2010). Agarwal and Medury (2014) argue that in detecting fraud, the internal 
auditors are better equipped when compared to the external auditor since the internal auditor have a 
continuous presence in various facets of the organization year-round and year after. The constant 
communication with various facets makes the internal auditors more knowledgeable about the 
organizations environment, procedures, and the internal controls (Agarwal & Medury, 2014). In addition, 
Agarwal and Medury (2014) state that the internal auditors remain aware of the constant changes made 
throughout the year, which affect the entire organization.  
Agarwal and Medury (2014) state that the internal auditor must keep pace with the constant changes in 
the environment in order to meet its goal of detecting fraud, hence it is important for internal auditors to 
be aware of the control environment.  However, the fact that the internal auditors work within the 
organization, in other words they are a part of the control environment and are also used by organizations 
as a fraud prevention mechanism raises the suspicion on whether the control environment of an 
organization has an influence on the possibility of internal auditors to detect fraud.  
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1.3 Research Objectives  
The objective of this study is to investigate from the internal auditor’s perspective whether the control 
environment has an influence on the internal auditor’s possibility to detect fraud.  
1.4 Research Questions 
The thesis tries to answer the following questions: 
Major question (related to major research objective): Does the control environment influences the 
possibility of internal auditors to detect fraud?   
To support the major question, the thesis answers some minor questions: 
Minor questions (related to minor research objectives): 
Ø Which are control environment factors?  
Ø How internal auditors perceive the possibility of their department in detecting fraud? 
Ø Is there any different view of internal auditors who have different experience and different 
perception of their roles in factors influence on the perception of possibility to detect fraud? 
Ø Is there any correlation between perception of possibility of detecting fraud and internal 
auditors’s year of experience? 
Ø Is there any correlation between perception of possibility of detecting fraud and internal 
auditors’s perception of their role in connection with detecting fraud?  
Ø Is there any correlation between control environment and possibility of internal auditor to detect 
fraud? 
1.5 Scope and Limitations 
The limitation of this thesis is that it finds out the ability of internal audit in detecting frauds in a specific 
country (US); therefore, the research cannot represent a conclusion at a global scale. The research uses 
questionnaires to collect data. Therefore, the quality of data depends on the honesty and unbiased of the 
participant’s answers. In addition, only one of the five elements of the COSO framework is used for the 
research.  
1.6 Beneficiaries 
Our research on how the control environment influences the possibility of internal auditors to detect fraud 
can provide benefits to an array of people. In the research landscape, future researchers will be able to use 
this study, as there are more and more studies focusing on the internal audit function. In specific, this 
study can be used when conducting studies in the internal auditor’s capabilities in detecting fraud.  
The research will help organizations have a better understanding whether the control environment has an 
influence on the internal auditor when detecting fraud.  In addition, this information can be used by the 
organization to improve policies and procedures within the organization in regards to the internal 
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auditor’s role in detecting fraud.  The internal auditor can use this study to improve their role in detecting 
fraud as they can evaluate whether some findings from this study apply to their organization.  
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The structure of this thesis will be as follow:  
Chapter 1: Introduction: This part gives an overview of the research and background knowledge about 
internal audit in detecting and preventing fraud. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review: This part reviews previous literature on fraud; the role and the factors 
influenced on internal audit in detect and preventing frauds and find out literature gap. 
Chapter 3: Theory and thesis’s hypotheses formation: This part discusses the relevant theoretical 
framework and how the research forms hypotheses.  
Chapter 4: Empirical research: This chapter provides a more detail on the empirical research, how the 
research is designed and explains the research methodology used for this study.  
Chapter 5: Analysis & Results: This part presents data analysis and answers the research questions. 
Chapter 6: Discussion & Conclusions: This part concludes the research study and recommendation for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Introduction 
In order to have a better understanding on the meaning of fraud used in the context of this study this 
chapter begin with defining fraud. In addition, fraud mechanisms are crucial in detecting fraud, therefore, 
an overview on the internal auditors’ role and responsibilities is provided as a tool used to detect fraud. In 
order to provide a better understanding of the duties of an internal auditor, the role of the internal auditor 
will be discussed.  The role of the internal auditor is divided into two parts, assurance and consultancy; 
thus, the connection of fraud with the roles and responsibilities of the internal auditor within each of the 
two roles is made. Previous research in connection with internal auditors, control environment and the 
role of internal auditors in detecting fraud will also be discussed in more detail. Moreover, since the study 
will be conducted based on the COSO’s control environment details about this element is provided. 
Additionally, research found on skepticism on the internal auditor’s role to detect fraud will be discussed.  
Finally, literature gap found during the review will be presented. 
 
2.2 Definition of fraud 
Fraud is defined to be a crime committed by a deceitful practice in order to obtain an unfair advantage, 
money, or goods (Hornby, 2015). According to Petrascu and Tieanu, fraud is an act that can be committed 
by any individual with the objective to gain something, cause a loss, and/or expose risk in a deceptive 
way (Petrascu & Tieanu, 2014). The IIA defines fraud as (IIA, 2013): 
“Any illegal act characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust. These acts are not 
dependent upon the threat of violence or physical force. Frauds are perpetrated by parties and 
organizations to obtain money, property, or services; to avoid payment or loss of services; or to 
secure personal or business advantage.” 
In addition, corporate fraud is defined as a deceitful act being committed by an organization and not just 
by one individual (Bloomsbury Business Library, 2007).  All definitions agree that the act is done in a 
deceitful manner, yet they differ in regards that one definition specifies that one individual can commit 
fraud while others emphasizes that only organizations or a group of people can commit fraud and one 
does not include any details regarding this.  In specific, IIA’s definition give emphasizes on parties and 
organizations and not to individuals.  
Nicolescu (2007) adds the economy to the definition of fraud as he claims that the entire economy is 
negatively affected by fraud.  Fraud can weaken the stability within the society, induce threats in the 
democratic structure, result in public losing trust in the economy, have tremendous financial losses, 
and/or can corrupt and compromise economic and social institutions (Nicolescu, 2007). When comparing 
this definition to the previous ones it can be seen that Nicolscu establishes the victim(s), in this case 
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society, while the others do not mention victims. Furthermore, Gullvist and Jokipii add to the definition of 
corporate fraud by categorizing fraud into two types: fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation 
of assets (Gullvist & Jokipii, 2012). Moreover, Romney et al., (1980) aggregate factors to fraud as they 
state that fraud risk can exist in conditions/situations, opportunities, and or personal traits, which can 
affect management or employees to engage in fraudulent behavior (Romney et al., 1980). These 
definitions look deeper into corporate fraud by categorizing types of fraud and providing factors that 
could lead to fraud.  
Highlighting from different definition of fraud in literature review, for the purpose of this study, fraud is 
defined fraud as intended deceitful actions committed by a person or group of individuals in order to 
create a benefit for themselves and usually resulting in a loss to others.  
2.3 Fraud mechanism  
Efforts to detect fraud include influencing employees to restrain from committing fraud and reducing the 
likelihood of fraud occurring (IIA, 2013). International Standard on Auditing state that those responsible 
of governance, usually the board of directors and management, should put a strong emphasis on fraud 
prevention by implementing effective internal controls and accounting systems (Accountants, 2009).  This 
also includes creating an honest culture and promoting ethical behaviors that must be reinforced by 
constant monitoring and oversight (Accountants, 2009). Furthermore, in order to detect fraud oversight is 
very important; oversight can be conducted in several different ways whether it is within or outside the 
firm (IIA, 2013). Though both the board of directors and management are responsible for implementing 
internal controls for detecting fraud, the board of directors is responsible for providing explanations if 
fraud is detected. The board of directors must oversee and evaluate how executives manage fraud risk 
(IIA, 2013). 
Many firms give the responsibility of ethics to the audit committee of the board of directors (Persons, 
2008). The audit committee is responsible for the oversight of fraud risks, internal controls, and 
management (Petrascu & Tieanu, 2014).  They must oversee controls to prevent and detect management 
fraud and report any fraudulent activity to the board and senior management.  Like the board of directors, 
the audit committee should also set the tone at the top in order to create awareness that no type of fraud 
will be accepted (IIA, 2013). According to Person’s findings the audit committee members must hold 
frequent meetings and be independent from the company and top management in order to increase the 
effectiveness of the committee in regards to ethics disclosure (Persons, 2008). They must also provide 
recommendations on changes or additions that will improve the effectiveness of internal control. In 
addition, the audit committee is usually responsible for hiring external auditors for the reporting of 
financial statements. Furthermore, more often than not, the audit committee is responsible for the internal 
auditors (IIA, 2013). 
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The fraud prevention and detections programs for many companies rely heavily on the internal auditors 
(Nicolaescu, 2013). When considering the probability of fraud, internal auditors must exercise due 
professional care (IIA, 2009) as the likelihood of the auditor to detect fraud is crucial for the firm. 
Therefore, internal auditors evaluate the procedures that they believe are most effective in order to detect 
fraud (Nicolaescu, 2013). Based on audit plans, internal auditors evaluate fraud risk within a company. 
They investigate any suspicious of fraud, analyze the cause and make recommendations for improvement. 
It includes evaluations in search of misappropriation of assets and information misrepresentation. They 
must keep the audit committee and board of directors informed about their work and any findings (IIA, 
2013). However, Nicolaescu suggest that internal auditors face different incentives upon detecting fraud 
when there is a lack of oversight on the internal auditors (Nicolaescu, 2013).  
 
2.4 Definition of internal audit and possibility of detecting fraud 
The role of the internal auditor has been constantly changing, which has been encouraged by professional 
institutions such as the Institution of Internal Auditor (Nickell & Roberts, 2012). The definition of IIA 
highlights important aspects of internal audit role (Petrascu, 2010). According to IIA, an internal auditor 
conducts independent, objective assurance and serves as an advisory role in order to add value and 
enhance a firm’s operation by using systematic and disciplined approach; they assess and improve the 
effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes in order to help an organization 
reach its goal (IIA, 2015). This definition of IIA differentiates with their previous definition mainly in the 
aspect that IIA recognizes the consulting role of internal auditors and reiterate that by performing 
consulting work, internal auditors can add value to the organization (Institute of Internal Auditors , 99). 
According to ISA 610, internal audit function can be understood as “a function that performs assurance 
and consulting activities designed to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the entity’s governance, 
risk management and internal control process” (IFAC, 2013). Notice that comparison with IIA definition, 
the definition of IFAC on internal audit removes “independence and objective” in the function of internal 
audit because according to IFAC, they are “inappropriate” and “never be true” in the context of 
enterprises (IFAC, 2009).  
Petti (2010) defines possibility as within the range of (Petty, 2010). Oxford Dictionary defines it as the 
state or act of being possible (Hornby, 2015). In the context of this study, when using the word possibility 
is refers to the chance that internal auditors detect existing fraud. The word possibility is used because in 
the case that fraud is non-existent than that automatically means that there is no possibility or chance that 
the internal auditors can detect fraud since it is non-existent. Our study is based on the internal auditor’s 
perspective therefore it can also be argued that the auditor may perceive that there is a possibility 
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detecting of fraud. In addition, there are there thousands of variables that define whether the possibility of 
fraud and therefore makes it difficult to measure possibility.  
 
2.5 The role of internal audit 
According to IIA, the two main role of internal audit is assurance and advisory. Internal Auditing 
provides assurance on the organization’s governance, risk management and control processes to help 
firms reach their goals in strategy, operations, finances, and compliance (IIA, 2015). The following 
diagram depicts the assurance role of internal audit:  
 
	  
Figure	  2.1	  Internal	  Audit	  Assurance	  Role	  	  
IIA (2013) 
According to Deloitte (2012), in the assurance role, internal auditors must focus on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the firm’s policies and operations as well as the firm’s compliance with rules and 
regulations.  There are several impacts that can result from fraud within a firm therefore it is crucial for a 
firm to have a fraud mechanisms in place; these mechanism include the help of internal auditors in order 
to reduce fraud (Deloitte., 2012). According to the International Professionals Practice Framework, 
internal auditors must have sufficient knowledge about their firm in order to assess the risk of fraud; if 
fraud is detected by the internal auditor they are required to report the risk to the board (Deloitte., 2012).  
In order for the internal auditor to provide an objective assurance they should evaluate the potential of 
fraud occurrence and determine the method to manage fraud risk by the firm (Deloitte., 2012).  
According to Petrascu and Tieanu (2014) the internal audit is an efficient line of defense against fraud as 
annual audits help with fraud prevention.  Internal auditors have a role both in the monitoring risks and in 
fraud prevention and detection (Petrascu & Tieanu, 2014). Lepadatu (2011) also agrees that internal 
auditors should be responsible for fraud prevention, fraud identification, and reporting the fraud 
(Lepadatu, 2011). Petrascu and Tieanu (2014) state that internal auditors have the obligation to further 
investigate any suspicion of fraud and inform personnel responsible for dealing with fraud in most cases it 
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is usually the audit committee.  They are also obligated to take actions in order to eliminate or reduce the 
probability of fraud. However, Petrascu and Tieanu (2014) claim that it is important to note that internal 
auditors are not responsible for the prevention of fraud and error (Petrascu & Tieanu, 2014).   
Petrascu and Tieanu state that in order for “internal auditor to have success in its roles of detecting fraud, 
he/she must have a superior level of theoretical knowledge and practical experience” (Petrascu and 
Tieanu 2014, pp. 493).  Internal auditors should be familiar with possible fraud scenarios and be able to 
detect signs of possible fraud within their industry (Petrascu & Tieanu, 2014). During audit planning, 
internal auditors must assess the risk that fraud and error may lead to misrepresentations in the financial 
reports and must ask management for any information previously found on fraud and error (Petrascu & 
Tieanu, 2014). In addition, the internal auditor must question management in order to determine whether 
there was any assessment done on any misrepresentation in financial statements and if they could be due 
to error or fraud (Petrascu & Tieanu, 2014). The internal auditors must seek that any errors detected are 
corrected; he/she should have appropriate and enough evidence in order to demonstrate that there is no 
fraud or errors (Petrascu & Tieanu, 2014).  If internal auditor finds fraud or error it must be reported in 
the financial reports; however, there is a possibility that the fraud can go undetected (Petrascu & Tieanu, 
2014).  
Bota-Avram, C., Pop, and Bota-Avram, F. (2009) argue that in the future internal auditors will face more 
important challenges in “developing skills, in assessment the effectiveness of risk management” (Bota-
Avram et al., 2009, pp. 201-202).  These challenges will increase the credibility of internal auditor role 
(Bota-Avram et al., 2009).  Bota-Avram et al (2009) highlight a survey conducted by PWC which 
concludes that “an internal audit’s approach in the light of reasoning centered on professional risk” (Bota-
Avram et al., 2009, pp. 202) should be developed.  In addition, the survey found that globalization; 
changes in risk management, technological, organizational skills and talent, and changing role of internal 
audit are trends that will have an impact on internal audit function in the near future. These findings are 
limited to one survey, hence one could question if there are additional factors influencing internal auditors 
(Bota-Avram et al., 2009) 
Besides the assurance role, internal audit also has advisory role. In the advisory role, internal auditors 
help management and governing bodies to identify risks and also provide an overview of the effectiveness 
of firm’s controls and procedures and regulations compliance (IIA, 2015). This shows in activities such as 
performing training in internal control, advising management on building new control system, developing 
internal policies, and taking part in quality team (Anderson, 2003). In addition, the work of the internal 
auditor can serve as the external auditor’s principal evidence for the opinion of the companies’ internal 
controls, which puts great reliance on the internal audit (Scheider, 2008).  In its advisory role, internal 
auditors should partner with management in order to identify, evaluate, and implement controls and 
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methods to address any fraud risk (IIA, 2013). Internal auditors should provide advisory expertise to 
management in implementing fraud prevention measures by having knowledge of the firm’s strengths and 
weaknesses; internal auditors also help in finding better solutions or best practices to fraud risk and/or 
provide training on fraud to employees (IIA, 2009). 
The Statement on Auditing Standards No. 109 suggests that internal auditors should be the primary 
source for information in order to design and operate the internal control in a company (Scheider, 2008). 
Hence, internal auditors review and document the internal controls covering key processes, identify key 
control points, and then test those identified controls; also, internal auditors are to help top management 
develop or improve criteria if the current one is found to be inadequate (Scheider, 2008).   The 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing obligates internal auditors to 
assist top management in maintaining effective control by evaluating how efficient and effective the 
controls are.  The Standards require internal auditors to ascertain that the criteria for internal controls are 
adequate (IIA, 2013). According to E&Y, internal auditors are taking up advisory roles such as advising 
on audit committee effectiveness, examining management decision-making process, helping shape audit 
committee charters and agendas, and guiding executives on how to present to the audit committee (E&Y, 
2011). However, arguments exist that the advisory responsibilities can compromise the internal auditor’s 
independence since it may lead management to see the internal auditor as a member of the team 
(Kawashima, 2007). 
2.6 The role of internal auditor in detecting fraud 
In comparison with advisory role, assurance role is more connected with the role of internal auditor in 
detecting fraud because detecting fraud can help to ensure the effective and efficient of internal control 
system within the organization, whereas, advisory role more involves with maintenance and development 
of internal control system. The guidelines by IIA specifically detail that the internal auditor’s main 
responsibility is not to detect and prevent fraud, however due to the recent publicized fraud scandals 
many organizations have made changes to their internal auditor’s role to have a more active stance in 
detecting fraud.  During the literature review it is found that there was much more research related to the 
external auditor’s role in detecting fraud as oppose to internal auditor’s role in detecting fraud. However, 
more and more research seemed to be conducted due to the changes in the internal audit role in regards to 
corporate governance after the implementation of SOX. 
A study conducted by Coram et al., (2006) found that organizations with an internal auditor department 
were more likely to detect fraud when compared with organizations that did not have internal auditors.  
They also concluded that internal auditors add value to the organization by improving the control and 
monitoring environment in order to detect fraud (Coram et al., 2006).  Agarwal and Medury (2014) 
discussed the effectiveness in internal auditor to contain, detect, and prevent fraud in which they 
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introduce the concept of outside stakeholders appointing internal auditor in order to strengthen the 
internal auditor’s independence from the company.  They argue that by strengthen the independence it 
would also increase the effectiveness to detect and prevent fraud (Agarwal & Medury, 2014). In addition, 
Petrascu and Tieanu (2014) conducted an analysis on the internal auditors role in detecting fraud and 
concluded that internal auditors provide firms with an advantage in more business efficiency, it reduces 
cost while maximizing profit, and helps achieving medium to long-term objectives (Petrascu & Tieanu, 
2014).  
Williams and Clements (2002) provided five risk factors that could be affecting the internal auditor’s 
duties; four out of the five factors affecting their work were control factors related to asset 
misappropriation.  From their survey they also concluded that internal auditors do not feel like their 
primary responsibility is to prevent and detect fraud for the benefit of the organization.  However, internal 
auditors did believe it was their main responsibility to prevent fraud in regards to detriment of the 
organization.  An additional finding in their study is that internal audit charters in their department did not 
emphasize specification on the internal auditor’s role in detecting any type fraud (Williams & Clements, 
2002).  
Drawing on the profession theory, Chambers and Odar (2015) give an analysis of the internal auditor’s 
history and providing the current stance of the profession. In their analysis they concluded that the 
internal auditor’s role had not been made for their intended purpose of governance mechanism.  However, 
they state that recent changes in the internal auditor’s role in governance mechanism has enhanced their 
role in providing more dependable assurance to the board and being more effective in the corporate 
governance (Chambers & Odar, 2015).  
Much of the previous research seeks to determine whether the internal auditor adds value to the 
organization in detecting fraud. Furthermore, much information on factors that could influence the 
capabilities to detect fraud was not found.  
2.7 Control Environment and best practice  
The control environment is the one of the five components of the COSO framework and it is composed of 
the following five principles (COSO, 2013): 
1. Integrity and ethical values 
2. Board of director’s independency from management and oversight of internal controls 
3. Organization structure 
4. Attracting, develop, and retain quality employees 
5. Management’s control philosophy and risk appetite 
Klamm and Watson (2009) claim that the control environment provides the foundation for the rest of 
COSO elements and sets the tone at the top. The control environment, which is a non-transaction-oriented 
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element (Ramos, 2004), is comprised of standards, procedures, and structures that provide the grounds for 
carrying out internal controls within the organization make up the control environment (COSO, 2013), 
However, many process activities within a firm are affected by the pervasive structure of the control 
environment (Ramos, 2004).   
According to Lightle et al., (2007) the most critical as well as the hardest element to effectively manage 
and evaluate in the COSO framework is the control environment. Ramos (2004) also agrees that an 
assessment of the control environment can be rather difficult. For example, a corporation could present a 
code of ethics as proof of their commitment to integrity and ethical values; however, the mere existences 
of this policy cannot prove the policy’s effectiveness (Ramos, 2004). Klamm and Watson (2009) 
examined internal controls from both an information technology and non-IT perspective in relation to the 
COSO framework; however, for our study only the non-IT perspective was reviewed.  Their study 
consisted of 490 firms that had material weaknesses reported during the first year of compliance under 
SOX 404.  Their study proved the interdependency amongst the elements of the COSO Framework. This 
study also found that the number of misstated accounts is positively related to the number of weak COSO 
elements (Klamm & Watson, 2009).  They claim that a weak control environment within an organization 
has an effect on the rest of the elements, thus they will also be weak.   
 A control environment that is effective will make the other elements in the framework stronger (Lightle 
et al., 2007). A sign of an effective control environment is employees being aware that they are expected 
to do the right thing in addition to receiving support by management, even if it means negatively affecting 
the bottom line. However, if the control environment is weak, the rest of the elements will also be weak 
(Lightle et al., 2007).  Lightle et al., (2007) suggest that internal auditors should survey the employees 
within the organization in order to determine whether upper management has created an ethical 
environment.  Lightle et al., (2007) claims that this is a more effective approach since it focuses on the 
messages employees are receiving and not what message management thinks it is conveying as the 
current assessment of asking management whether policies and procedures have been implemented.  
According to Vo (2007) corporations should allow its employees to assess the control environment by 
reporting on management’s ethical behavior and integrity.  Vo (2007) claims that this alternative is 
cheaper and more effective for detecting financial reporting fraud when compared to the current 
requirements by SOX 404 of management assessing the internal control (Vo, 2007).   
As stated previously, there are different principles of the control environment, however characteristics of 
the principles, which make up the control environment must be discussed in order to define what 
contributes to a good and effective control environment. In a good control environment the organization 
will demonstrate its commitment to integrity and ethical values by promoting honesty and integrity on a 
daily basis (COSO, 2013). This includes having an effective communication method in order for the code 
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of ethics to reach its employees.  Board members demonstrate independence from management and 
effectively oversee the strategic direction of the organizations (COSO, 2013). Management establishes an 
appropriate and effective structure, reporting lines, authority and responsibilities, which aid the 
organization in meeting its goals; this must be accomplished with the help of board members. In addition, 
organization should demonstrate commitment to attracting and developing competent employees as well 
as displaying transparency in promotion and recruitment process in order to instill trust to help retain 
valuable employees (COSO, 2013). 
This provides underlying characteristics of the control environment. However, it is important to note that 
there are several variables that affect these characteristics and that a measurement of what is good in each 
of the variables will vary depending on the company. For example risk appetite of an investment firm 
may be higher than the risk appetite in a non-profit organization, therefore when allocating a measure of 
what constitutes a good internal control environment each organization should be evaluated individually.  
2.8 Previous researches on detecting fraud and factors influencing internal auditor’s performance 
Fraud issues received attention from many researchers. Professional literature has tried to understand the 
elements of fraud mechanism, which include internal audit. Previous literature deals with the problem of 
internal audit and fraud detection by discussing two main concepts: role of auditor/internal auditor in 
relation with fraud management and factors that influence on quality/performance of internal audit. The 
following part will review previous researches by categories of researches followed by these two 
concepts.  
Role of auditor/internal auditor in relation with fraud management: When answering the question why 
auditors cannot discover all frauds, Albrecht, W, & Hoopes, J, (2014) start with the role of auditor and the 
difference in nature between financial auditors and fraud auditors. By comparing between the purpose, 
scope, method, procedure, timing, reason for testing control, reliance on management, training and expose 
to fraud, they find out that several factors can lead to the failure of financial auditors when detecting fraud 
(Albrecht & Hoopes, 2014). They divide these factors in two groups: (i) group of reasons that lead to 
failure of fraud detecting but auditor were not negligent such as nature of accounting records, unwilling of 
company’s staff to disclose what they are aware of and (ii) group of reasons that lead to failure of fraud 
detecting but auditor were negligent such as lack of independence or professional due care (Albrecht & 
Hoopes, 2014). The limitation of this research is that the research uses normative approach, therefore, 
lack of empirical research to support their findings. Although this research discusses the factors that lead 
to failure in detecting fraud of financial auditorsand focuses more on accounting transaction testing rather 
than internal control environment testing, the research method and several factors, such as independence 
or professional due care can be applied in the case of internal audit (Albrecht & Hoopes, 2014) .The 
researches of (Stuart, 2014) Petraşcu & Tieanu, (2014), and Floştoiu (2012) use the concept of internal 
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audit role in detecting and preventing fraud, in addition, Floştoiu (2012) uses the model of internal 
method of fraud management (Flostoiu, 2012). However, the researches only discuss within the scope of 
the role of internal audit in fraud management with normative approach and explain how they can add 
value to the organization. These researches do not discuss on factors that influence the internal auditor’s 
work.   
Using the role theory, the research of Hassink et al. (2009) discusses in the aspect of audit expectation gap 
(Porter, 1993). In the research of Hassink et al. (Hassink et al., 2009), the questionnaire was used to find 
out the difference in perception of three groups: managers, bankers and auditors in the responsibility of 
auditors in detecting fraud and is based on the audit expectation gap theory. This research provides 
evidence about audit expectations gap in the context of fraud. In comparison with bankers, business 
managers have fewer tendencies to judge performance of auditors. However, this research is based on the 
survey with limitation of sample size, therefore, when generalizing, it may not provide an accurate 
conclusion. Discussing audit responsibility in detecting fraud, Chong (2013) uses the theory of fraud 
triangle.  This research finds out that auditing profession experiences a cycle from not having 
responsibility for detecting fraud to gaining the responsibility of detecting fraud (Chong, 2013). Although 
the responsibility of auditing profession in detecting fraud increases, the numbers of frauds are still high. 
The author studies this problem and finds out situations where fraud can took place. However, this 
research’s approach is normative therefore, it needs empirical research to prove these findings.  
Factors that influence on quality/performance of internal audit  
Discussing about internal audit reporting line and fraud management, Norman et al., (2010) uses 
motivation theory and COSO framework to explain that internal auditor are motivated to obtain  audit 
results that can protect themselves. They conclude that internal auditors believe that lower personal 
threats exist when reporting high-level risks directly to audit committee directly than reporting directly to 
management (Norman et al., 2010). In addition, using the triangle theory, they formulate the hypothesis 
that auditors are more sensitive to opportunity and insensitive when they assess fraud in comparison with 
the case that they use holistic risk assessment (Norman et al., 2010). With the same interest on internal 
audit reporting line, James (2003) discusses the influence of internal audit structure on fraud prevention 
perception. His research is based on a numbers of substantial theories of influence of managers on the 
work of internal auditors and reluctance of internal auditor to report the fraud to audit committee (James, 
2003). Coram et al. (2008) look at the internal audit structure with the link of fraud management in 
different perspective. They use substantial theories on cost-benefit effectiveness, whistle-blowing to 
compare the benefit of in-house internal auditors and outsourcing internal auditors in fraud management 
(Coram et al., 2008). However, these researches are conducted by a survey within a region and therefore, 
when generalizes to a general conclusion, it may be effected by this limitation.  
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Internal audit reporting line or internal audit structure is not the only factor that previous researches have 
highlighted. Asare et al. (2008) examine which factors influence internal auditors when evaluating fraud 
and whether audit committee quality and management performance incentives have influenced the 
process. Based on internal audit theory, they argue that internal auditor may face conflict of interest when 
they evaluate the audit committee quality when assess risk of fraud, whereas, their performance is 
evaluated by audit committee (Asare et al., 2008). In the relationship with management performance 
incentives, they use the sustainable theory on this relationship to formulate the hypotheses. 
Communication factor also receives attention of professional researches. Both research of Hooks et al. 
(Hooks et al., 1994) and Maguire-Krupp & Ramamoorti (Maguire-Krupp & Ramamoorti, 2011) discusses 
communication factors and uses whistleblowing as background for their research. However, Maguire-
Krupp & Ramamoorti (2011) use agency theory and corporate governance in particular in addition for 
their research. Training, environmental awareness, professional skepticism and experience factors are also 
considered in the resarch of Saksena (2008); expectation theory is used to for this research (Saksena, 
2008).  
In a broad view of factors that influence the internal auditor/auditor on fraud perception, Reed Smith et al. 
(Reed Smith et al., 2000) use two-stages model to examine how internal control assessment influence on 
substantive testing of auditors when they modeling fraud detection. Finley (1994)  examine how auditor 
choose fraud level and sample level based on game theory (Finley, 1994). The research of Law (2011) 
tries to find out organizational factors that can lead to the absence of fraud. He connects previous research 
with AICPA’s three criteria of preventing fraud to formulate the hypotheses (Law, 2011).  
Each of these researches uses one theory to support their hypotheses formulation. However, if a 
combination of the related theories had been used to present a diversified perspectives in their researches,  
the findings would provide a more proper view.  
The following table (table 2.1) summarizes the previous researches and theories are used in these 
researches:  
Table	  2.1	  Previous	  Researches	  &	  Theories	  	  
Authors What were measured Main results Method 
Main 
model/theories 
used  
          
Albrecht, W, & 
Hoopes, J 2014, 
Factors that make it 
difficult for auditors  
to detect all fraud 
Develop a list of factors based on the 
comparison between the financial auditing 
and fraud auditing 
Nomative 
approach Audit Theory 
Petraşcu, D, & Tieanu, 
A 2014 
Role of internal 
auditor 
Finds out the role of the internal audit in 
detection of possible frauds 
Normative 
approach   
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Floştoiu, Sebastian, 
2012 
Role of internal 
auditor in fraud 
management 
mechanism 
The role of internal auditors improves the 
company's performance leading to more 
responsibilities in identifying and finding 
fraud 
Normative 
approach 
Internal audit 
method of fraud 
management 
(Zikmund P) 
Chong, G 2013 Audit responsibility in detecting fraud 
Auditing profession experiences a cycle 
from not have responsibility for detecting 
fraud to have responsibility. Although the 
responsibility of auditing profession in 
detecting fraud increases, the numbers of 
frauds are still high. The author studies 
this problem and find out situations where 
fraud can take place. 
Normative 
approach Triangulation 
Hassink, H, Bollen, L, 
Meuwissen, R, & de 
Vries, M 200 
Corporate fraud and 
the audit 
expectations gap 
Provides evidence about audit 
expectations gap in the context of fraud. 
In comparison with bankers, business 
managers have fewer tendencies to judge 
performance of auditors. 
Quantitative 
method 
Porter (1993) on 
audit expectation 
gap 
          
Norman, C.S; Rose, 
A.M; Rose, J.M., 2010 
Internal audit 
reporting lines 
 Internal auditors are aware of more 
personal threats when reporting high 
levels of risk directly to the audit 
committee in comparison with 
management. This leads internal auditors 
to lower assessed levels of fraud risk 
when reporting to the audit committee. 
Quantitative 
method 
Motivation Theory 
and Triangle 
Theory 
James, KL 2003 Internal audit structure 
Audit outsourcing leads to increase in 
perceived audit expertise but does not 
lead an increase in user belief in the 
internal audit function because they do 
not think that  outsourced auditors have 
more in-depth knowledge of the company 
than in-house internal audit departments 
Quantitative 
method   
Coram, P, Ferguson, 
C, & Moroney, R 200 
Corporate 
goverance, internal 
audit structures 
 Companies having an internal audit 
function are more likely to detect fraud 
than those without such function to detect 
and self-report fraud. In addition, 
companies that rely solely on outsourcing 
for their internal audit function are less 
likely to detect fraud than companies who 
have internal audit department. 
Quantitative 
method   
Asare, S, Davidson, R, 
& Gramling, A 2008 
internal auditors’ 
fraud risk decisions 
In the aspect of audit committee quality, 
internal auditors in both roles (self-
assessment and due dilligence role) are 
sensitive to variations in quality, but the 
reaction to quality variations rely on 
which role they play. 
Quantitative 
method 
Internal Audit 
Theory and 
Sustainable 
Theory  
Hooks, K, Kaplan, S, 
& Schultz Jr., J 1994 Communication 
Develops four categories of things to be 
considered in evaluating the control 
environment 
Normative 
approach Whiste blowing 
Saksena, PN 2008,  fraud prevention 
Organizations should update and consider 
a fraud examiner in order of audit 
efficiency. 
Normative 
approach 
Expectation 
Theory  
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REED SMITH, J, 
TIRAS, S, & 
VICHITLEKARN, S 
200 
Interaction betwwen 
internal control 
system and 
susbstantive testing 
No matter of the auditor's allocation; the 
probability of undetected fraud does not 
change. However, the allocation of audit 
resources to internal control assessment 
helps save cost.  
Quantitative 
method Two stages model 
Law, P 2011 
organizational 
factors that are 
associated with the 
absence of fraud 
The test result shows that the audit 
committee’s effectiveness, internal audit 
effectiveness, the tone at the top 
managerial level, and ethical guidelines 
and policies are positively coefficient 
with non-existence of fraud within 
organizations 
Quantitative 
method and 
qualitative 
method 
AICPA model 
Salehi, M, & 
Mansoury, A 2009, ' 
Effect to fraud 
detection 
How firm size, conflict of interest, market 
mechanism, audit regulation effect on 
fraud detection 
Quantitative 
method   
	  
2.9 Literature gap 
Internal auditor have no primary responsibility for fraud management in organization, however, the role 
of internal audit as part of the fraud detecting mechanism is very important. Previous researches have 
been done on organization fraud, which focus on the role of Board of Directors, managers and role of 
external auditors. In the field of internal audit research, previous literature has discussed about the role of 
internal audit in organization in general and factors influencing on their performance. Research about the 
control environment usually focuses on the importance of the element within the organization. There is no 
prior studies that connect the control environment and role of internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to fill this gap. 
2.10 Conclusion 
The definitions of fraud provide a better understanding of fraud in the business world. From the 
definitions presented it was concluded that fraud is any actions that are deceitful resulting in a type of 
benefit. The role of the internal auditor has developed as a part of the corporate governance mechanism to 
detect and prevent fraud; however for our study purposes the main focus will be on the internal auditor’s 
responsibility in detecting fraud. In its consultancy role, internal auditors advise management and board 
of directors about the implementation of internal controls, policies, and procedures in order to help 
prevent and detect fraud.  While in the assurance role, internal auditors affirm, in most cases to the board 
of directors, that those controls, policies, and procedures are being followed.  The control environment, an 
element within the COSO framework, is crucial for organizations. However, there is a lack of research on 
does the control environment influence the possibility of the internal auditor in detecting fraud.   
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND THESIS’S HYPOTHESES FORMATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviews the previous researches and finds out the literature gap. Previous literatures have paid 
little attention to factors that lead to failures of internal auditor in detecting fraud. These do not help 
understand in depth about factor constraints and how to they can be improved. Therefore, a suitable 
approach to finding out the factors that lead to failure of internal auditor in detecting fraud is needed.  
To have a comprehensive method of finding out the constrained factors, in previous chapter, a discussion 
of theories applied in the previous research will be presented. The previous chapter discusses how 
researches problematize and how they apply theories to deal with the research problem.  In this chapter, 
theories applied to this thesis and hypotheses developed from the research will be presented. The research 
process is designed as the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Hypotheses formation 
 
Factors influencing the possibility of auditors in detecting fraud are various. The research of Albrecht & 
Hoopes (2014) explains why auditors are not able to detect all fraud. They argue that financial auditors 
have different methods, procedures, objectives, etc. when compared to fraud auditors; therefore, there are 
several factors both objective and subjective that constraint the possibility of financial auditors when 
detecting fraud. In addition, the research of Bungret et al., (2009) also pointed out that even if auditors 
have performed their work properly, fraud may not be detected due to inherent constraints of an audit. In 
comparison with financial auditors, internal auditors are more embedded with the organization (Bunget et 
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al., 2009); this suggested looking at possibility of auditors in detecting fraud in the relationship with the 
control environment factor.  
3.2.1 Connection between control environment and internal auditor’s perception on the possibility to 
detect fraud 
Control environment refers to management’s philosophy and risk appetite, oversight of the Board of 
Directors, organization’s commitment to ethical values, organizational structure, and human resource 
standards (COSO, 2013). A solid control environment can assist to prevent fraud (IIA, 2013).  In this part, 
arguments on connection between internal control environment and possibility of internal auditors in 
detecting frauds are presented. Each factor of internal control environment will be discussed in 
connection with possibility of detecting fraud. 
Management’s control philosophy and risk appetite 
Agency theory derived from information economics, which depicts the relationship between principal – 
agent, in this relationship, agents receive a number of authorization from the principal to manage and 
direct the organization on their behalf (The Institute of chartered accountants in England and Wales, 
2005). In this case, the principal assumes that the agent acts on principals’ best interest. However, agents 
may have different motivation than that of the principal and their actions can be affected by many factors 
such as financial motivation and labor market; due to information asymmetries between principals and 
agent, the problem of trust is raised. (The Institute of chartered accountants in England and Wales, 2005). 
Agency theory deals with two main problems: the first one is the difference or conflict in the desire 
between the principal and agent; the second one is difference in awareness of risks between these two 
parties (Eisenhardt, 1998).  
Risk appetite, according to the research of Belghitar & Clark (Belghitar & Clark, 2012) includes risk 
seeking, risk neutrality and risk aversion, of which, risk aversion is the most popular and presented when 
managers dislike taking risk and try to avoid risk. Their research shows that there is a strong relationship 
between CEO’s risk appetite and the firm’s volatility. The research of Burns and Kedia (2006) found that 
there is an association between financial fraud and managers’ risk appetite (Burns & Kedia, 2006). When 
considering managerial incentive for fraud, Fung (2015) uses cumulative prospect theory and finds that 
the higher the probability reference gains or lower the probability reference loss, the higher probability of 
fraud and vice versa (Fung, 2015). Atwood et al., (2012) argues that organization culture can have an 
influence on employee’s decision to disclose fraud. Unethical behavior by management can impact 
operations, financial reporting, and legal compliance.  If there is a weak ethical organizational culture, the 
probabilities of a flawed internal control increases creating an illusion of controls existing (Atwood et al., 
2012). In addition, Holmes et al., (2002) found that fraud is less likely to occur if top management firmly 
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supports internal controls (Holmes et al., 2002). A survey of 250 CFOs in Hongkong and 20-semi-
structured interviews to CFOs in the research of Law (2011) shows that the tone at the top management 
level is an important factor that can reduce fraud in organization.  
The trustworthiness of financial reporting process of the firms depends much on management’s 
commitment to integrity (Cohen & Hanno, 2000). The management control philosophy is all activities 
and attitudes of managers toward control (COSO, 2013). The survey of Cohen and Hanno (2000) to 96 
auditors asked about the strong and weak management control philosophy influencing the audit’s 
planning and judgment; they found that management control philosophy affects auditors in audit planning 
and judgment (Cohen & Hanno, 2000). From these previous researches, the risk appetite of management 
can have an affect on the entire organization and makes it more vulnerable to fraud.  
The Board of Director’s oversight 
COSO emphasizes that the role of Board of Directors on the control environment is very important. 
Together with managers’ philosophy and risk appetite, Board of Directors play a role of setting the tone at 
the top for the organization (COSO, 2013). Kieke (2013) mentions that Board of Director should have 
responsibility for compliance program oversight of the organization (Kieke, 2013). The research of Rose 
(2007) found that the Board of Directors play an important role in monitoring the CEO when designing 
and implementing corporate policies (Rose, 2007). A research, conducted by using surveys from 203 
publicly-listed Australian organizations within the 2006–2009 periods, shows that there is a relation 
between Board of Directors composition and reduction of tax aggressiveness (Richardsona et al., 2013). 
The research of Dechow et al. (1996) shows that there is a strong relationship between the likelihood of 
earning manipulation and weakness of the Board’s oversight on management (Dechow et al., 1996). An 
audit committee, which is an operating committee within the Board of Directors, helps Board of Directors 
carry out their oversight responsibility (The Instiute of Internal Auditors, 2013). The research by 
McMullen (1996) shows that a strong audit committee can help firms avoid mistakes and incompliance 
with the regulations (McMullen, 1996). A research by Wright (1996) suggests that there is a strong 
relationship between audit committee and the quality of financial reporting (Wringht, 1996).   
The research by Alzeban and Sawan (2015) was conducted using a survey as the research method and 
regression analysis; the questionnaire was sent to 542 chief internal auditors in the UK and had a response 
rate of 34%. The study concluded that having an audit committee that is knowledgeable about accounting 
and auditing issues will increase the effectiveness of the internal audit function. In addition, they also 
found a positive correlation between the number of times the audit committee met with the internal 
auditor and the effectiveness of the internal audit function (Alzeban & Sawan, 2015). Moreover, Adel and 
Maissa (2013) used interviews from 50 chief internal auditors in Tunisian to conduct a study that (Adel & 
Maissa, 2013) found that on average the audit committee meets with the chief internal auditor about 3.78 
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times per year, which according to the researcher is favorably when compared with other countries such 
as the US (3.30), Canada (3.03), and Australia (4.53).  
COSO (2013) also states that a calendar establishing timing and frequency of meetings as well as enough 
time should be allocated to meet with the internal auditors. In addition, the members of the board, which 
includes the audit committee, should be assessed in order to confirm that they have the ability and 
expertise to provide an effective oversight (COSO 2013). Previous researches show that there is a 
relationship between audit committee’s expertise and the number of times they met with the internal 
auditor and the effectiveness of the internal auditor. Based on the COSO framework and previous 
research, four questions were formulated for this research about the frequency of meetings between the 
audit committee and internal audit, time allocated to meeting with management and internal auditors, and 
the audit committee’s expertise.  
Integrity and Ethical Values 
According to COSO’s (2013) framework, one of the ways an organization can demonstrate its 
commitment to ethical values is by establishing a professional code of ethics as well as effectively 
communicating the code to its employees. In addition, the organization should establish consequences for 
deviating from the code and take prompt action if conduct of employee(s) deviates from the code (COSO, 
2013).  Firms can demonstrates a commitment to integrity and ethical values by setting appropriate tone 
at the top, establishing and evaluating standards of conduct, and addressing any deviation from standards 
in a consistent and timely manner (COSO, 2013).  Nel et al., (2011) studies whether elements of corporate 
ethics programs have an effect on ethics within the firm’s culture by using a survey consisting of 11 
questions with sub-questions; they had 61 useable responses from 438 that were sent to members of an 
organization in Auckland, New Zealand (Nel et al., 2011). Using the Kruskal Wallis tests they found that 
when incorporating ethical behavior in a company’s culture, code of ethics, ethical training, rewarding 
and disciplining, the effectiveness and efficiency of employees increased. In addition, related to the ‘tone 
at the tope’ they recommend that senior executives should set the example in regards to ethical behavior 
(Nel et al., 2011).  
From previous research Ghosh (2008) found that well-defined values within an organization have an 
influence on manager’s attitude when making ethical decision. Additional, research has been consistent in 
indicating that employee behavior and actions are highly influenced by the values of management 
(Ghosh, 2008). Ethical values within an organization become eroded once upper management is viewed 
as encouraging rule-breaking and fostering an intimidating, aggressive environment. In their study they 
assessed whether corporate values have an influence on employee’s everyday decision and which values 
permit ethical values to be manifested.  Ghosh’s (2008) experimental study, which included 94 
participants that were provided a questionnaire, found that corporate values that were profit-oriented 
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influenced employees to take make more unethical actions, however; when management values integrity 
the results were different.  Again Ghosh (2008) suggest that management at the top should promote 
ethics. 
Based on a case study where he reviews the history of a company, Oliverio (1989) states that 
organizations must maintain adequate internal controls in specific the code of ethics.  Oliverio (1989) 
states that internal auditors are a critical link to the control environment as they have a role in monitoring 
the code of ethics, though he emphasizes that internal auditors can not assure the company maintains 
ethical values (Oliverio, 1989). Stevens (2007) reviews studies of corporate code of ethics since the year 
2000 and concludes that the code of ethics can be an effective tool to influence ethical behavior.  She 
emphasizes that in order for the code of ethics to be a success the code must be communicated effectively 
(Steven, 2008) 
To conclude, the five questions related to the code of ethics for this research are based on the COSO 
framework and previous research. Previous research states that establishing a formal code of ethics is a 
crucial tool for deviating employees from unethical behavior and it should be communicated effectively 
to employees. In addition, research found that ethical codes along with other policies should be reviewed 
and updated frequently in order to conform to the constant changes of the organization. Furthermore, part 
of having an effective code of ethics means that the organization should assess whether the code is being 
followed and any deviation from the code should have consequence. Not having any consequence would 
motivate employees to follow examples of employees not following the code. Therefore, the survey 
questions will be base on these findings of previous researches.  
Organizational Structure  
According to COSO, management along with oversight by the board should establish structures, reporting 
lines, and adequate authority and responsibilities in order to meet corporate goals, which will help create a 
stronger control environment (COSO, 2013). According to Janićijević (2013) the culture of a firm is 
affected by the firm’s structure and vice versa, therefore it is crucial for the organization structure to be 
aligned with culture. The structure of a firm will have a positive impact on the culture if the employee 
behaviors implied by the structure are in accordance with the culture of the company; through the process 
of institutionalization, the values of the company will become stronger (Janićijević, 2013).  
Ford and Slocum (1977) states that there organizational structure is not a one size fits all, therefore 
organizations should implement a structure that fits its respective contingencies. They conduct a review 
previous literature on the relationship between organization structure and the organization’s size, 
technology, and environment; this can be explained by institutional theory. Meyer and Rowan describes 
institutional theory as a course in society, duties, or actualities that achieve a law-like status in society 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Institutional theory explain the reason for a firm’s shape to be similar or like 
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other firm within the same industry (Sonnerfeldt, 2015). Institutional theories are the building blocks used 
by communities, governance, and firm to shape decisions, their image, or behavior (Kite, 2013). The 
formal structure of a firm seems to mirror their institutional environment’s myths rather than what their 
work activities demand (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory is highly influential on the formal 
structures of a firm.  According to Vito (2008), when reviewing the company’s structure, internal auditors 
should look for red flags such as mangers who have spans of control too good to be practical, middle-
managers who only have one manager underneath their oversight, and reporting lines that are not clearly 
defined or that show multiple, conflicting reporting relationships (Vito, 2008). One of the important 
factors in organizational structure includes the reporting lines or communication channels (COSO, 2013). 
It is important for the information flow in an organization structure to support the achievement of the 
organization’s objectives. As stated previously, research has found that organizational structure is not a 
one size fits all for organizations; therefore, the same should apply to flow of information.  Based on the 
COSO framework, three questions for this research were formulated about the flow of information.  
Human Resource 
COSO (2013) framework states that one sign of a strong control environment is the firm’s commitment to 
attracting, developing, and attaining capable employees who are aligned with the goals of the firm. This 
includes establishing policies and practices, evaluating competence and addressing anything that needs 
improvement, providing adequate training, and assigning responsibilities. As many of the actions 
mentioned above are usually the responsibility of human resource, we reviewed previous literature on 
human resource practices (COSO, 2013).   
Adding to the importance of human capital, Mohammed et al., (2013) states that an organization’s most 
crucial asset is its human resource and the quality of this asset is dependent on employee’s knowledge 
gained through training, education, and their motivational levels; hence, the development of employees is 
one of the most important duties of the human resource management (HRM). As an important factor in 
achieving company goals effectively and efficiently, it is important for HRM to carefully hire employees, 
make efforts to retain the employees once they are on board, and train and develop them in order to 
enhance their capabilities (Mohammed et al., 2013).  
The study by Guericy et al., (2015) tests the affect that human resources management practice has on the 
ethical climate of an organization. According to them, an ethical climate is the perception shared amongst 
employees about what is correct behavior and how ethical situation are to be dealt with in the firm, thus 
this reflects how the employees perceive policies, practices, procedures, and what the firm expects from 
ethical behavior (Guerci et al., 2015).  Guericy et al., use the ability, motivation, and opportunity theory 
(AMO theory) in their study.  According to this theory, employees can be affected by human resource 
management in that it can enhance their capabilities in performing up to expectations and achieving 
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organization objectives, motivate them to perform up to the firm’s expectations by using contingent 
rewards and adequate performance measures, and allowing employees to be a part of certain processes 
such as providing input on job design.  For the study they sent an online questionnaire to 6,000 employees 
in six different EU countries.  From the analysis of the responses they concluded that human resource 
management (HRM) that includes enhancement in ability, motivation, and opportunity affect the ethical 
work climate. Guerci et al., (2015) claims this demonstrates that HRM has a powerful role within the 
ethical domain, as it affects the overall ethical values in the work environment of the employees (Guerci 
et al., 2015).  
Three questions about the human resource for this research were based on the COSO framework and 
previous research studies.  Previous research found that employees are affected by the human resources 
policies of their organizations; therefore two of the questions asked about the transparency of promotions 
and recruitment.  Organizations who are seen to have a fair promotion and recruitment process tend to be 
able to retain better talent than those who do not.  
Control environment factor and the first hypothesis 
Previous researches show that all elements of control environment are important to fraud management 
mechanism.  Role theory highlights how situation influences the way people act within their role. 
Situation-act model explains that when confronted with different situation, people act differently to cope 
with the situations (Ebimobowei & Kereotu, 2011). The term role can be understood as the responsibility 
that people take to meet the requirement in their work (Michael, 2001). The role concept highlights that 
people do not only act in lines with job description but they also interpret the job description with their 
own perception. It reflects how they perceive the context they are in and how they think they should react 
to the situation within their role (Ebimobowei & Kereotu, 2011). Therefore, we argue that the control 
environment is an important factor that can affect internal auditors when performing their role. Previous 
researches also considered internal controls as a significant factor influence on internal auditor/auditor on 
fraud management. Reed Smith et al. (Reed Smith et al., 2000) argued that internal control quality can 
influence the decision of auditors on substantive testing when modeling fraud detection. The research of 
Law (2011) shows that organizational factors can lead to the absence of fraud (Law, 2011).  
Besides role theory, triangle theory embedded in ISA 240 and SAS (Statement on Auditing Standards) 99, 
provides three reasons that can lead to fraud: Incentives/Pressures, Opportunities, 
Attitudes/Rationalizations (Soltani, 2014). Opportunities can result when weak internal control are in 
place (Dorminey et al., 2012). Internal control environment, therefore, is a crucial part in detecting fraud. 
The research of Reed Smith et al., (2000) shows that distribution of audit resources to internal control 
assessment can save cost for the auditors because a good internal control environment can help reduce the 
work load by reducing the sample in substantive test. Ahmad and Norhashim (2008) conduct an empirical 
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study to investigate the relationship between employees’ attitudes toward fraudulent behaviors at 
workplace and the control environment. The study used a self-administered questionnaire survey with a 
sample of 433 employees in Malaysia (Ahmad & Norhashim, 2008). A regression analyses identified 
aspects within the control environment that may influence employees’ view towards fraud. Weak control 
environment provides a good opportunity for fraud to happen, whereas, internal audit is limited in 
resource because there always exist agency cost, which the cost to run the trust mechanism. However, 
previous researches have not found out whether there is any coefficient between internal control 
environment and the possibility of internal auditor to detect fraud. Therefore, we come to the first 
hypothesis:  
H1: There is correlation between the internal control environment and the perceived possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
 
The first hypothesis can be summarized by the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assumption with the first hypothesis: Because there is no previous research on the correlation between 
the internal control environment and perception of internal auditors on possibility of detecting fraud, it is 
assumed that the five elements of COSO framework can be used as variables to test this correlation. 
3.2.2 Experience of internal auditors 
Auditors use professional judgment in performing their works. It is an important factor that influences the 
quality of auditors’ performance.  Bonner and Lewis (Bonner & Lewis, 1990) perform a research on the 
relation between experience of auditors and their performance and come to the conclusion that 
experienced auditors have a higher performance than less experienced auditors. In addition, the research 
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of Ashton and Brown (1980) shows that the level of agreement on professional judgment is higher among 
experienced auditors than inexperienced auditors (Ashton & Brown, 1980). Bedard (1989) conducts a 
research to find out if there is any difference in knowledge between experienced auditors and less 
experienced auditors. He uses the cognitive approach for the research; the result shows that there is a 
difference exist (Bedard, 1989). In the relation with fraud, the research of Saksena (Saksena, 2008) shows 
that, along with training, environmental awareness, and professional skepticism, experience is an 
important factor for auditors to prevent fraud. However, previous research does not pay attention on how 
the experience factor has an influence on the internal auditor’s perception of possibility to detect fraud. 
And how the experience factor influences the perception of internal auditors on which factor are 
important in influencing the possibility of detecting fraud. Therefore, the next two hypotheses will be:  
H2: There is difference in views on the importance of different factors influencing the possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who have different experience. 
 
H3: There is a correlation between the importance of different factors influencing the perception of 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and experience of internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
3.2.3 Role of internal auditors 
 
According to agency theory, principal establishes a mechanism to enhance the trust on agency, called 
corporate governance, in which, internal auditors play an important role (The Institute of chartered 
accountants in England and Wales, 2005). The agency theory explains why organizations need internal 
audit as a mechanism to reinforce the trust. (Emnert & Johansson, 2010). In a research of ethics, Stango 
(2006) states that in order to identify the ethical problem in the corporation, CFOs should look in five 
areas: Policies and Procedures, Board operations, Management, Internal Audit and Compliance activities 
(Stango, 2006). According to Stango (2006), the lack of an internal audit function in an organization 
significantly increases the possibilities of corporate failure.  
In addition, role theory suggests that individual performance is the result of the environment, the context, 
competence, attitude and awareness, however, personalities have a significant influence on how people 
perform their role (Ebimobowei & Kereotu, 2011). In the context of internal auditor, internal auditors 
may have a different perspective of what their responsibilities are when compared with the expectations 
of managers, shareholders and society; this will raise the problem of audit expectation gap. A 
performance gap exists when the expectation’s on the internal auditor’s role from society is different from 
the internal auditor’s professional rules requirements. In the case of the performance gap, society's 
expectations may deviate from what auditors are formally required to do by their professional rules. 
Taking the performance gap into consideration, Porter (1993) subdivided the performance gap into 
deficient standards gap and deficient performance gap. The deficient standard gaps are obligations that 
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are reasonable to expect from auditors and auditors’ duties that are required by professional guidelines, 
rules, and regulations.  The deficient performance gap is the expectation of auditor’s performance in 
required duties and how society expects and perceives the auditors’ execution of his/her duties (Porter, 
1993, p. 50). Bollen et al (2009) finds out that society’s expectation on the role of internal audit has a 
positive relationship with audit performance expectation (Bollen et al., 2005). Hassink et al. (2009) found 
out that internal auditors are less certain about their duty related to fraud management, whereas, managers 
are more aware of this responsibility of internal audit.  
Management is solely responsible for implementing policies and procedures that will help the 
organization be in compliance with SOX, however the internal auditor should help management perform 
management’s responsibilities. Besides SOX, in IPPF, IIA guides the method to deal with fraud risks for 
internal auditor. The research of Petrascu and Tieanu (2014) mentions that the primary responsibility of 
fraud management belongs to Board of Directors and managers; internal auditors have no responsibility 
for fraud detection. However, the requirement of SOX and IIA put on the roles of internal auditors are 
broad which means the society and professional guidelines and regulations expect much from internal 
auditors. However, internal auditors have limited resource; therefore, they should make priority in their 
responsibilities. In addition, due to their various responsibilities, the understanding of their primary roles 
can be ambiguous. Research of Ahmad and Taylor shows that role ambiguity and role conflict has a 
negative effect on the performance of internal auditors (Ahmad & Taylor, 2009).  We argue that different 
view of internal auditors on their roles will lead to different view on which factors of the control 
environment is important in influencing their possibility in detecting fraud and lead to different 
perception of possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. Therefore, the next two hypotheses:  
H4: There is difference view on the importance of different factors influencing the possibility of internal 
auditors in detecting fraud among auditors who have different view in their roles.  
 
H5: There is a correlation between the importance of different factors influencing the perception of 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and perception of the internal auditor’s role in 
connection with detecting fraud. 
3.3 Summary of hypotheses 
The hypotheses for this research are summarized as following:  
H1: There is correlation between the internal control environment and the perceived possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
 
H2: There is difference in views on the importance of different factors influencing the possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who have different experience. 
 
H3: There is a correlation between the importance of different factors influencing the perception of 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and experience of internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
 
H4: There is difference view on the importance of different factors influencing the possibility of internal 
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auditors in detecting fraud among auditors who have different view in their roles.  
 
H5: There is a correlation between the importance of different factors influencing the perception of 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and perception of the internal auditor’s role in 
connection with detecting fraud. 
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the theories applied and the hypotheses developed for the thesis. The theories used 
are agency theory, role theory, triangle theory and institutional theory. Each of the theories provides the 
different perspectives that views internal audit works related to fraud management in different way. From 
this, they help develop the hypotheses with different perspectives, which ensure the discussion on the 
control environment that influences the possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. The thesis has 
developed five hypotheses, which will be discussed more deeply in relation to the empirical research in 
the next chapter of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the thesis is to find out whether there is any correlation between control environment and 
perception of internal auditors in possibility to detecting fraud. To obtain the objective, empirical research 
was designed and performed. This chapter aims to present the empirical method used to answer our 
research question. It includes details about the research design and quantitative approach and process. In 
addition, the design of the survey will be described in detail. The way the answers were obtained for the 
survey is also presented. The population and sample size of the survey will also be explained in this 
chapter. 
4.2 Research Approach 
4.2.1 Research Design 
To design a research with a conclusive research design, this research must ensure that the 
information is clearly defined, the sample is large, the process is structured and the analysis is 
quantitative (Malhotro, 2010). Previous research and theories have been viewed in this study and a 
table about the various approaches and conclusions of the previous research was presented. 
Therefore, it is believed that information and process is clearly structured. In the next chapter, the 
hypothesis was conducted which indicate a quantitative analysis has been applied in this research.  In 
addition, the nature of the research is a descriptive research design because this research attempts to 
describe how internal control environment influence on possibility of internal auditors in detecting 
fraud. Moreover, this research aims to find out the correlation between the independent variables and 
dependent variable, it can be considered as causal research design (Malhotro, 2010). 
The research design has also characteristics of a cross sectional nature, of which, our sample is large 
enough and data is collected from more than one case (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The cases were 
divided by internal auditor experience and geography, which can enrich the diversification of the 
answers. Hence, the research is limited to the US. One of most common method that is used in cross 
sectional nature is a web survey, which is also the method that was used in this research.  Another 
aspect of cross sectional design is that the single point of time in gathering data (Bryman & Bell, 
2011).  All the data in our study were obtained in a short period of time (from Monday, May 11, 2015 
to Friday, May 15, 2015) in order to ensure the condition of single point of time. One aspect associates 
with cross sectional design is an examination of patterns and relationship between variables (Bryman 
& Bell, 2011), which, the statistics program allows it to do this examination in this research. 
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4.2.2 Quantitative Research Strategy 
Quantitative research approach puts emphasizes on objectivity, measurement, reliability and validity; it is 
dependent on statistics and figures (Lee, 1992). The qualitative research method, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the description of culture and meaning; it subjective and uses language and description (Lee, 
1992). For this empirical study the quantitative approach was the best option for analyzing the surveys. 
According to Riff et al., (2014) quantitative is used to analyze collected data in order to describe a 
common pattern or characteristics or to identify important relationships among the content that is 
examined (Riffe et al., 2014).  
4.2.3 Primary Data  
Primary data was collected using a survey as it is used as a means to collect data about individuals or 
social units from the perspectives of individuals (Rossi et al., 1983). The survey included 24 close-ended 
questions of which 21 were multiple choice and three questions asks participants to rank items. The first 
two questions in the survey were general information questions followed by questions about the 
participant’s perceptions of probability of their department detecting fraud.  In addition, it included at 
least three questions about each of the five principles within the element of control environment from 
COSO’s framework; however, some of the principles had more than three questions. The final question 
asked the opinion of the participant on factors that can influence the difficulty of their department in 
detecting fraud.  The survey can be found in the appendix.  
4.3 Deductive Process 
This research study tries to understand the correlation between the internal control environment and the 
perception of possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. Previous researches have done with 
broader or closer topics with different way of approach, which were presented in chapter 2 and 3. Based 
on our research objective, necessary hypotheses were formulated. The research, in nature, was conducted 
with a deductive approach. The first step of the deductive process is looking at the previous research and 
the theoretical framework they used. This step was done in order to gain a deeper knowledge of the 
research field and formulate the idea on how this research should be designed.  
The next step of deductive process is formulation of the hypotheses. To formulate hypotheses, we make 
arguments based on triangle theory, role theory, institutional theory, agency theory and substantive 
theories. The hypotheses were in the form of the relationship between more than two variables, which 
would be tested in several statistics tests. The knowledge of positivism was used in this step, which is a 
natural science method that helps explain a social phenomenon (Mastin, 2008). In this case, a statistics 
test was used to examine a social phenomenon.  
The third step is related to the data collection, this step is very important because the data should be 
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collected big enough to run the tests and form a conclusion on whether to accept or reject the 
pre-formulated hypotheses. The questions were partly based on previous research and partly based on 
related theory. Therefore, it will help ensure the reliability and validity of the research. 
After collecting data, the next step is analyzing the results of the data collected. The data was analyzed 
using the quantitative analysis. The result of the data analysis will conclude whether there is a relationship 
between the variables or there is no reason for a relationship.  
Final step is revising the theory. After analyzing the data and arriving at conclusion, the conclusion will 
discuss how the results can be supplemented by the current theories.  
4.4 Sampling 
In 2015, the IIA’s website reported that the number of IIA members in North American was 72,500 
people (The IIA, 2011); therefore, the total members of IIA in US is smaller than this number. However, 
there is no information on the number of IIA members in the US in the IIA website. We choose members 
of IIA in the US as the population for our survey.  
Internal auditors can have various job titles such as financial analyst making it difficult to determine the 
target population of this profession or obtain a sample. Because of this we have used snowball sampling 
in our research. Snowball sampling requires researchers to make contact with a small group of people 
who are relevant to the topic in order to communicate with others (Bryman, 2012).  One of the issues that 
could arise from snowball sampling is that the sample will unlikely be a representative of the population, 
however, this is one the reason why snowball sampling is used since the population is difficult to 
establish (Bryman, 2012).  
In order to obtain our sample we visited the IIA website and obtained email information from chapter 
officers. We made sure to include at least one chapter from each state but for states that are more 
populated such as California and Texas we included more chapters in order to reach as many IIA 
members as possible.  We e-mailed a total of 400 US Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) chapters. In 
addition, 14 emails were sent to personal contacts who are internal auditors in the US. E-mail recipients 
were asked to forward the e-mail or link to the survey to their IIA members. In addition a link to the 
survey was posted in LinkenIn inviting internal auditors within the US to take the survey. The survey was 
made available through sogosurvey.com from Monday, May 11, 2015 to Friday, May 15, 2015. There 
was a total of 143 responses or a 34% response rate and no responses were removed due to poor answer 
quality. 
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4.5 Empirical Measurement Method 
4.5.1 The primary data and the questionnaire 
Primary data was collected using web-based survey as it is used as a means to collect data about 
individuals or social units from the perspectives of individuals (Rossi et al., 1983). A web-based survey 
means that participants are directed to a website in order to answer the survey (Bryman, 2012).  One of 
the limitations with the web-based survey includes the possibility of poorer data quality (Bryman, 2012).  
The website used for the survey has a control into place which prohibits the same IP address from 
submitting the survey twice, however, there is no way verify the identity of participants in order to 
determine whether they used different computers in order to submit the survey twice, hence this is one 
disadvantage to an online survey. Couper (2004), referenced in Bryman (2012), state that the problem 
with not knowing who is answering the survey is increased because of the ability of internet users to 
adopt an online identities.  In addition, the survey did not require participants to include name or place of 
work as we intended the survey to be anonymous. 
The survey included 24 close-ended questions in which 21 are multiple choice and 3 questions that allows 
the participant to rank answer options. Using close-ended questions make it easier for participants to 
respond and enhances the comparability of answers; however, close-ended questions prohibits the 
researcher from obtaining spontaneity in the participants response, difficult to make answers exhaustive, 
and could irritate participants if they are not able to find an answer that best applies to them. (Bryman, 
2012). 
The first question asked about the internal auditor’s experience. The second question asked the participant 
to rank the importance of task within their internal audit.  The tasks were to be ranked from one to six 
with six being the most important task.  The next three questions were close-ended questions that related 
to the perception of the participants in probability in detecting fraud within their organization.  These two 
set of question were followed by five set of question about each of the five principles of the control 
environment.  
The first principle of the control environment is top management’s control philosophy and risk appetite 
which included a total of three questions; two close-ended questions and one question that asked 
participants to rank five roles of management within their organization with five being the highest priority 
and one being the lowest. The second principle is code of ethics, which included five close-ended 
questions about the ethic procedures within their organization.  The third set of questions was in regards 
to the HR policy and it included three close-ended questions.  The fourth principle is the organizational 
structure and it included three close-ended questions. The last principle is the board of director’s 
oversight, which included a total of four close-ended questions. The final question asked the participant to 
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rank the five factors listed as 5 being the most influential and 1 being the least influential.  The following 
table details which factors pertained to which question and which principle it was related to: 
Table	  4.1	  -­‐	  Summary	  of	  Principles	  &	  Factors 
Principle Question Factors  
Top management control 
philosophy and risk 
appetite 
Q 3.1 Degree of Management's risk appetite 
Q 3.2 Priorities of risk management  
Q 3.3 Management's emphasis on control issues 
Integrity and Ethical 
Values 
Q 4.1 Existence of code of ethics 
Q 4.2 Maintenance and updated of ethical codes  
Q 4.3 Effective communication code of ethics 
Q 4.4 Monitoring of code of ethics 
Q 4.5 Consequence of employees who deviate from code 
of ethics. 
Human Resource Policy 
Q 5.1 Existence of Human Resource Policy 
Q 5.2 Transparency of recruitment process 
Q 5.3 Transparency of promoting process 
Organizational structure 
Q 6.1 Flow of information from management and 
employees 
Q 6.2 Flow of information from employees to management 
Q 6.3 Flow of information amongst the departments 
Board of Directors 
Oversight 
Q 7.1  Frequency of meetings between audit committee and 
internal auditor 
Q 7.2 Frequency of meetings between audit committee and 
management 
Q 7.3 Audit Committee's time allocation to its oversight 
responsibilities 
Q 7.4 Expertise of audit committee 
4.5.2 Dependent and independent variables 
H1: There is correlation between the internal control environment and the perceived possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
Dependent variable: the dependent variable is the variable that needs to be measured and affected by 
independent variables. In this research for hypothesis 1, dependent variable is the possibility of internal 
audit in detecting fraud. This is measured based on perception of internal auditors about the possibility of 
their department in detecting fraud. This variable includes three items: possibility of detecting fraud in 
comparison with other companies in the same industry, in comparison with themselves in previous years, 
and possibility of detecting fraud in the next year according to their perception. 
Independent variables: There are 5 independent variables which are: Management control philosophy and 
risk appetite, code of ethics, human resource policy, organizational structure, and the Board of Directors 
oversight. Each variable is measured by several items as presented in empirical measurement method part 
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and mostly use likert scale, where low score indicates the signal of weak internal control environment and 
high scale indicates the signal of best practice in internal control environment. The 0 score is used when 
the answer shows there is no existence of a policy or no opinion of the participants.  
H2: There is difference in views on the importance of different factors influencing the possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who have different experience. 
Dependent variable: In this research for hypothesis 2, dependent variable is the years of experience of 
internal auditors. There are four groups of internal auditors by their experience in this research: less than 2 
year, more than 2 years and less than 5 years, more than 5 years and less than 10 years and more than 10 
years. Of which, the less experience group, the lower score in the scale they get. The likert scale is from 
1-4 or 0-4 depends on the information of the answer. 
Independent variable: To measure how different view of internal auditors who have different experience 
on the factors influence the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud, the question about ranking 
of these factors are used. Therefore, the ranking is independent variable in this case. Factors are scored 
from 1 to 5 based on their positions in ranking according to internal auditors 
H4: There is a correlation between the importance of different factors influencing the perception of 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and experience of internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
Dependent variable: In this research for hypothesis 3, dependent variable is the perception of internal 
audit about their role. There are six groups of internal auditors by their perception of their role in this 
research: detecting fraud is the first priority in their role, detecting fraud is the second priority in their role 
and so on. People who choose detecting fraud as the first priority in their role will be collected in 1 group 
numbered 1 and so on with other group. 
Independent variable: To measure how different view of internal auditors who have different perception 
on the role of their department on the factors influence the possibility of internal auditors in detecting 
fraud, the question on ranking these factors are used. Therefore, the ranking is the independent variable in 
this case. Factors are scored from 1 to 5 based on their positions in ranking according to internal auditors 
Hypotheses 3 and 5 find the correlation between two variables, of which, no variable explains for another. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to determine the independent and dependent variables.   
4.6 Reliability and Validity 
4.6.1  Reliability 
For quantitative research, one important requirement that should be met is that the data must be stable 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011). The stability of data means the results should be the same regardless when the 
tests are performed and it ensures the results of the study can be repeatable (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
Therefore, the followings are considered when reviewing the research’s data.  
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Stability: To ensure that the results of the test are stable when implementing the test at different points in 
time, the items in this research have been carefully checked to ensure the reduction of fluctuations. 
Therefore, a pre-study was implemented to reduce to ability of fluctuation of the data. This pre-study was 
conducted by a small group of 9 people to make sure that the length of questionnaire is appropriate and 
people can understand the questions well. Nine people who are working as internal auditor in Sweden 
were asked to do the pre-study survey. These people in Sweden were selected because they were able to 
provide quick and detailed feedback in order to change the research questionnaire if necessary. However, 
there was no change to the questionnaire.  By performing the test and retest, the different estimates by the 
interval can be attained.  
Internal reliability: One characteristics of data reliability is internal reliability. This means that all the 
items in one factor should be consistent so that there is less conflicting in the answers of respondents.  To 
test internal reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha test was implemented. The way the test was conducted and the 
results will be presented in the next chapter. The ability to sum up all items within a factor will be 
considered based on the result of the test.   
Inter-observer consistency: There is a concern of lack of consistency when several people take part in the 
recording or translation of data. This may lead to the lack of consistency in their decision-making. 
However, our survey required a self-completed questionnaires and it did not allow for more than one 
person to respond at once, therefore, this characteristic can be ensured 
4.6.2 Validity 
The research is concerned with two kinds of validity of the data: internal validity and external validity. 
Internal validity ensures that the aim of the research that finds out the correlation between independent 
variables and dependent variables can be achieved. It considers the aspect of the accuracy of the 
experiment.  External validity ensures that conclusion insight about the correlation between internal 
control environment and possibility of detecting fraud in US is supported.   
Concerning the internal validity, in this research, we used the questionnaires that was asked by different 
previous research and make arguments to supports this questionnaires presented in chapter 3. Since these 
questionnaires were used and tested at least once in previous researches, it increases the ability of internal 
validity in this research.  
Concerning the external validity, the external validity allows a conclusion to be made about the 
relationship between internal control environment and possibility of detecting fraud that were found in the 
research, which can be generalized to other circumstances beyond this study.  Another interesting aspect 
is to what extent the generalization can be made, for example, this research should only be generalized for 
people who are member of IIA in US, for all internal auditors in US or for all internal auditors in global 
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scale. In order to generalize beyond the study, a non-probability sampling method should be applied.  
The representativeness of the sample as followings: in this research, 414 e- mails were sent; most of them 
were selected randomly to send  (except emails send through personal contacts) but to ensure that at least 
one participate in each state in US.  Since the research was conducted in a small scale in US, we believe 
that the result of this research should not be generalized in US and global scale. Because our 
representativeness of sample is from IIA member in US and we believe that the result of this research can 
be generalized to all internal auditors who are member of IIA in US. However, there are limitation in 
sampling method used in this research, which would lead to less possibilities to generalize; therefore, 
caution should be taken when generalizing the findings to other contexts.  
4.7 Selection of statistics tests 
Selection test for hypothesis 1 
The selection test for hypothesis 1 starts with the tests of Reliability and Correlation. The most popular 
test to check for reliability is Cronbach’s alpha test. At the beginning, our sample size is 46, however, 
when run the Cronbach’s alpha, the alpha value is very low, especially, alpha for the group of questions 
from 2.1 to 2.3 which is only 0,351. It was a really big problem because this group of questions was for 
dependent variable. If the group of independent variables has low alpha, when running the regression 
tests, it can treat them separately, but in the case of dependent variable, if one cannot summarize these 
questions, this research will have multi-dependent variables. This makes the regression test very 
complicated. Increasing the sample size may solve this problem, therefore, it was decided to send more 
emails and make phone calls to have more respondents. When getting the respondent numbers of 143, 
Cronbach’s alpha test shows that this value is at an acceptable level, which allows the summary of the 
questions from 2.1 to 2.3 and chooses average score of the answers for the questions from 2.1 to 2.3 as 
the representative dependent variable.  
The second test is correlation to make sure that there is no correlation between independent variables. 
Pearson’ correlation test was chosen because it shows the correlation in a matrix, which is easy to 
understand. In addition, the Pearson’s score can help understand the strength of the relationship between 
variables and the direction of the relationship.  
The third test considered is EFA test (factor analysis) to ensure that questions asked related to the 
construct that intended to measure. However, after running this test, it was realized that it is not necessary 
because Cronbach’s alpha test satisfied means the theoretical construct works. Therefore, this test was not 
selected.  
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The result of the Cronbach’s alpha test is satisfied, however, the test of correlation shows the multi-
collinearity phenomenon. This leads to the fact that the regression test, if ran, will have inaccurate results. 
In this case, there are two solutions for this problem:  
- Run the regression stepwise, for each factor added on, it should be checked if the result is in 
correspondence with the correlation matrix. If the regression stepwise matrix does not help, the 
variables that are closely correlated should be treated separately by crosstab or correlation matrix.  
- Use Principal component analysis (PCA) 
However, when running regression stepwise test, there are only two variables entered to the model, which 
are AVG 7.1-7.4 and AVG 3.1-3.3; this cannot help solve the problem. Therefore, a selection of PCA is a 
must.  
After covert the data to PCA, when checking the correlation between the new set of independent 
variables, the Pearson’s test shows that the correlation between the independent variables is removed. It 
allows the normal regression test to be done with entered method.  
To sum up, the tests that are used for hypothesis 1 is:  
ü Cronbach’s alpha 
ü Pearson’s correlation 
ü PCA 
ü Regression test 
Selection test for hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 4:  
The nature of hypothesis 2 and 4 are the same, therefore, the selection of tests will be the same. Because 
these hypotheses found out if there is difference in ranking of important factors influencing possibility of 
detecting fraud among the group of internal auditors, a crosstab and Chi-square tests were first selected. 
However, when running the Chi-square test, due to the small sample size, there are more than 20% have 
expected count less than 5 means that Chi-square is not really statistics confident. It is decided to keep 
crosstab because this will help describe the data; a test that compares between k independent samples is 
selected.  
One question of running this test is whether to use non-parametric or parametric test. Although the sample 
size is more than 30, the test of non-parametric is selected because the sample size is still small in 
comparison with the population. Therefore, Krukal Wallis test is chosen.  
In short, the test chosen for hypothesis 2 and 4 are:  
ü Crosstab 
ü Krukal Wallis 
Selection test for hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 5:  
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The nature of hypothesis 3 and 5 are the same, therefore, the selection of tests will be the same. Choosing 
the tests for hypothesis 3 and 5 is very simple because it is a simply test of the correlation between two 
variables. The most popular test is Pearson’s correlation, therefore, it is chosen. The test shows that there 
is no correlation between these two variables; therefore, no more tests were conducted.  
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter provides a detailed process of the empirical method used in this research. It is the 
background for the next chapter: Data analysis. This chapter explains the research design, sampling, the 
quantitative method and the deductive process. The way of sampling, measurement method is also 
presented. In this chapter, it is found about reliability and validity, which are necessary to ensure the 
quality of the data before running the test and make the analysis. Finally, this chapter presents dependent 
and independent factors for each hypothesis in order to make it clear to the readers about what should be 
measured for the test. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter presented how the empirical research was designed and conducted. Based on 
the data collected and the research design, this chapter will present the descriptive statistics data and 
related statistics tests used for hypothesis and analyze of the test results. Finally, based on the results 
of the tests, conclusions on hypotheses will be presented.  
In general, the total numbers of respondents are 143 answers for each question from 1.1 to 7.4 except 
the question 4.2 (How often are ethical codes reviewed and updated?), which has only 141 answers. 
This is because people who selected the answer No for this question 4.1 (Does your company have a 
formal code of ethics?) was asked to skip question 4.2. There are two people who chose No for 
question 4.1, therefore, the number of respondents for question 4.2 is 141. The two people who 
skipped question 4.2 will be treated as missing data when running the tests.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics on respondent profile 
The descriptive statistics data on respondent profile will be presented in this part to assist readers in 
understanding the data better. 
Experience of internal auditors 
When looking at the experience of internal auditors, the largest group of respondents accounts for 
33.6%, which had more than 10 years of internal audit experience. The second largest group, 
consisting of 32.9% of the respondents, has experience of more than 5 years but less than 10 years. The 
group of people who have experience more than 3 years but less than 5 years accounts for 21.7% and 
the least group has less than 2 years of experience, which consists of 11.9%. An explanation to the 
allocation of experience can be that the surveys were emailed to people who are members of IIA, most of 
them have more years of working in internal audit field, therefore, it influences the structure of 
respondents in the way that group of people who have more than 10 years of experience and group of 
people who have more than 5 years of experience but less than 10 years of experience account for 
majority. It may be good for the survey because it is assumed that people who have more experience 
usually have better understanding on the organization they worked; therefore, the quality of the questions 
would be better than in the case where the majority of respondents have less experience as an internal 
auditors. The following table (table 5.1) summary the description of this variable: 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
40	  
	  
Table	  5.1	  –	  Experience	  of	  Internal	  Auditors 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 17 11.9 11.9 11.9 
2.0 31 21.7 21.7 33.6 
3.0 47 32.9 32.9 66.4 
4.0 48 33.6 33.6 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
Role of internal auditors in connection with detecting fraud 
In regards to the role of internal auditors in connection with detecting fraud, the group of people who 
think that detecting fraud is the most important role in their job accounts for 12.6%; this is the same 
number as the group of people who think that detecting fraud is the second priority in their roles. The 
third percentile was 21.7% and 26.6% ranked as the fourth priority in their role in comparison with 
other tasks of their work. The last two groups think that detecting fraud is the least important in their 
role, 23.8% consider detecting fraud is second least important and 2.8% think that detecting fraud is 
least important. It can be explained as following: according to IIA guideline and SOX, detecting 
fraud is not internal auditor’s primary responsibility, the primary responsibility belongs to CEOs and 
BODs; therefore, it is not the priority in internal auditors’ role. Table 5.2 and 5.3 show the 
description of this variable:  
Table	  5.2	  	  -­‐	  Role	  of	  Internal	  Auditor	  in	  Detecting	  Fraud	   
N Valid 143 
Missing 0 
Mean 3.552 
Std. Error of Mean .1156 
Median 3.000 
Mode 3.0 
Std. Deviation 1.3824 
Variance 1.911 
Range 5.0 
Minimum 1.0 
Maximum 6.0 
Sum 508.0 
Table	  5.3	  	  -­‐	  Role	  of	  Internal	  Auditor	  in	  Detecting	  Fraud	  (Percentage)	   
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 4 2.8 2.8 2.8 
2.0 34 23.8 23.8 26.6 
3.0 38 26.6 26.6 53.1 
4.0 31 21.7 21.7 74.8 
5.0 18 12.6 12.6 87.4 
6.0 18 12.6 12.6 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
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5.3 Statistics tests and analysis of hypothesis 1 
This section is divided into four parts. Firstly, the defined variables (both dependent and independent 
variables) used for the statistics tests will be presented; in this part a description of the variables will 
be presented. Secondly, one condition of regression test, which is reliability of the data will be 
discussed. In this section, the reliability of the variables will be tested and the results will be 
discussed. Thirdly, a Pearson’s test on correlation of variables is conducted and analyzed to ensure 
the condition of regression is met. Fourthly, component analysis method is introduced with the 
process to convert the data; the regression test based on component analysis and conclusion on 
hypothesis 1 will be presented.  
Hypothesis 1 related to the question from 2.1 to 7.4 in the survey.  
5.3.1 Description of variables 
5.3.1.1 Dependent variable  
Perception on possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud (AVG 2.1-2.3) 
The group that measures the perception on the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud 
includes three questions from 2.1 to 2.3. Question 2.1 asks about the probability of detecting fraud of 
the internal auditor department in comparison with other organization in the same industry. The 
median of this question is 0, which means that the numbers of people who chose “lower probability” 
is highest. Question 2.2 and 2.3 ask about the probability that the department will detect existing 
fraud within the next year and the probability of the department to detect fraud changed during the 
last 5 years respectively. It is not too surprising that the number of people who chose the probability 
is from 51% to 75% is highest among four choices because it is the normal rate that internal auditor 
department can detect fraud. The number of people who agree that the possibility of their department 
has been improved is also highest among five choices for this question. The following table shows 
the description of the data. The detail of the description data will be found in Appendix 2.  
Table	  5.4	  –Description	  of	  Data	  for	  Dependent	  Variable	   
Statistics 
 Q2.1 Q2.2 Q2.3 
N Valid 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0747 .0961 .0735 
Median .000 3.000 4.000 
Std. Deviation .8929 1.1487 .8794 
Variance .797 1.319 .773 
Range 2.0 3.0 4.0 
Minimum .0 1.0 1.0 
Maximum 2.0 4.0 5.0 
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The dependent variable is the average of score of the answers for the questions from 2.1 to 2.3 (AVG 2.1-
2.3). The reason why the average is chosen as representative for this variable is (i) the cronbach alpha test 
shows that the alpha is 0.692 is more than 0.6; therefore, there is a consistency in these questions, which 
allows the ability to sum up the score of the answers of these questions. The next section will explain in 
detail the Cronbach’s alpha test. (ii) The average is chosen as a representative variable instead of sum of 
the scores of answers for these questions because it avoids the effect of different numbers of the question 
in each measure.  
5.3.1.2 Independent variable  
In general, if the Cronbach alpha for each group of measures is satisfied, the average is chosen as 
representative variable instead of sum of scores of the answers for these questions within one measure; 
this is done to avoid the effect of different numbers of the question in each measure. Section 5.4 will 
explain more about Cronbach’s alpha test.   
The detail of the description data will be found in Appendix 2.  
Independent variable 1: Top management control philosophy and risk appetite (AVG 3.1-3.3) 
The group measures top management control philosophy and risk appetite using three items. Variance 
of question 3.1 is 1,873 so the fluctuation in the answers of respondents, however, there is not much 
fluctuation in the answers of questions 3.2 and 3.3 among respondents. The following table shows the 
description of the data.  
Table	  5.5	  –	  Description	  of	  independent	  variable	  1 
Statistics 
 Q3.1 Q3.2 Q3.3 
N Valid 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .1144 .0842 .0899 
Median 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation 1.3684 1.0066 1.0752 
Variance 1.873 1.013 1.156 
Range 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Minimum 1.0 1.0 .0 
Maximum 5.0 5.0 4.0 
 
The independent variable is the average of score of answers for questions 3.1 to 3.3 (AVG 3.1-3.3). The 
cronbach alpha test shows that the alpha is 0.676 is more than 0.6; therefore, there is a consistency in 
these questions, which allows the sum up of the score of the answers from these questions.  
Independent variable 2: Code of ethics (AVG 4.1-4.5) 
In regard to measures of the code of ethics, mean of the answer for question 4.1 is nearly 1, this 
means that almost all participants chose the choice that there is a formal code of ethics in their 
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organization. The number of people who think that ethical codes were reviewed and updated once 
within a three-year period is the highest among choices for question 4.2. Variance for answers of 
question 4.3 (provide adequate ethical guidance) is 1.645 indicates a slightly fluctuation between 
answers for this questions of respondents, whereas, for question 4.4 (likelihood of detecting unethical 
behavior) and 4.5 (likelihood of punishment of unethical behavior), there is no much variant.  
Table	  5.6	  –	  Description	  of	  independent	  variable	  2 
Statistics 
 Q4.1 Q4.2 Q4.3 Q4.4 Q4.5 
N Valid 143 141 143 143 143 
Missing 0 2 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0138 .116 .1073 .0728 .0841 
Median 1.000 4.00 3.000 4.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation .1655 1.372 1.2826 .8702 1.0055 
Variance .027 1.882 1.645 .757 1.011 
Range 1.0 4 4.0 3.0 4.0 
Minimum .0 1 .0 2.0 1.0 
Maximum 1.0 5 4.0 5.0 5.0 
 
The independent variable is the average score of answers for the questions from 4.1 to 4.5 (AVG 4.1-4.5). 
The cronbach alpha test shows that the alpha is 0.673 is more than 0.6; therefore, there is a consistency in 
these questions, which allows the sum up of the scores of the answers from these questions.  
Independent variable 3: Human resource policy (AVG 5.2-5.3) 
The next group of questions measures the human resource policy. The independent variable is the 
average of score of the answers for the questions from 5.2 to 5.3 (AVG 5.2-5.3). The cronbach alpha test 
shows that the alpha is 0.746 (after exclude question 5.1) is more than 0.6; therefore, there is a 
consistency in these questions, which allows the sum up of the score of the answers from these questions. 
The exclusion of question 5.1 is presented in the section 5.4. 
The number of people who agree that the recruitment process of their organization is transparent is 
highest among choices for question 5.2, similarity, for question 5.3, the number of people who 
“agree” that promotion process of their organization is transparent is highest among choices. There is 
not many differences between people who choose answer for Q5.1, variance being only 0.034. 
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Table	  5.7	  –	  Description	  of	  independent	  variable	  3 
Statistics 
 Q5.2 Q5.3 Q5.1 
N Valid 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0743 .0938 .0154 
Median 3.000 3.000 1.000 
Std. Deviation .8889 1.1215 .1843 
Variance .790 1.258 .034 
Range 4.0 4.0 1.0 
Minimum 1.0 1.0 .0 
Maximum 5.0 5.0 1.0 
 
Independent variable 4: Organizational structure (AVG 6.1-6.3) 
This group measure of organization structure includes questions from 6.1 to 6.3. The independent 
variable is the average score of the answers for questions 6.1 to 6.3 (AVG 6.1-6.3). The cronbach alpha 
test shows that the alpha is 0.803 is more than 0.6; therefore, there is a consistency in these questions, 
which allows the sum up of the score of the answers from these questions. The description of data is 
shown in the following table:  
Table	  5.8	  –	  Description	  of	  independent	  variable	  4 
Statistics 
 Q6.1 Q6.2 Q6.3 
N Valid 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0809 .0906 .0780 
Median 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation .9672 1.0833 .9332 
Variance .935 1.173 .871 
Range 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Minimum 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Maximum 5.0 5.0 5.0 
 
Independent variable 5: Board of Directors’ oversight (AVG 7.1-7.4) 
Finally, the group that measures on Board of Directors’ oversight consists of four questions, of which 
answers from questions 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 get low variance, which indicates that there is not much 
difference in the answers of respondents. The description of data is shown in the following table: 
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Table	  5.9	  –	  Description	  of	  independent	  variable	  5 
Statistics 
 Q7.1 Q7.2 Q7.3 Q7.4 
N Valid 143 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0621 .0450 .0685 .0740 
Median 3.000 1.000 3.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation .7421 .5381 .8188 .8853 
Variance .551 .290 .670 .784 
Range 3.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 
Minimum 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 
Maximum 4.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 
 
The independent variable is the average score of the answers for questions 7.1 to 7.4 (AVG 7.1-7.4). 
Although the cronbach alpha test shows that the alpha is less than 0.6, the summary of the score and the 
average of the score can be calculated. The reason will be explained in section 5.4.  
5.3.2 Internal Reliability 
The test of internal reliability is needed to simplify the regression analysis. The aim of this test is to 
find out whether or not the items within each measure could be combined. To determine this, the test 
of inter- item reliability analysis was conducted. Each measure: Perception of possibility of detecting 
fraud, management’s control philosophy and risk appetite; code of ethics, human resource policy, 
organizational structure, the Board of Directors’ oversight were all internally tested in order to decide 
to combine the items into one variable. In addition, it is tested if there is inter-item reliability between 
these measures because if there is an inter-item reliability, we can combine all these measures into the 
control environment concept. The questions 1.1 and 1.2 is for general information, question 8 is 
related to ranking and does not belong to a specific measure and concept, they are excluded from 
these reliability tests. 
The result of the tests shows that each of the measure and concept has alpha more than 0.6, which 
indicates that the items and measures have an acceptable level of correlation with each other 
(Institute for digital research and education, 2015) except human resource policy and BOD’s 
oversight measures. Therefore, the items are within all measures and concept, except human resource 
policy and BOD’s oversight; measures can be combined to one new variable for each measure and 
concept. Cronbach’s Alpha test was used for the internal consistency reliability measurement. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha helps to test the correlation measurement of all items and shows the internal 
reliability between the items in order to measure the reliability of the data. The two measures, which 
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have alpha less than 0.6, were human resource policy and BOD’s oversight measures; this concept 
will thereby not be combined into one variable, the items within these measures should be used 
separately. 
The following table (table 5.10) will show the result of our internal consistency reliability testing: 
Table	  5.10	  –	  Cronbach’s	  alpha 
Measures/concept Cronbach’s alpha 
Perception of possibility to detect fraud 0.692 
Management’s philosophy and risk 
appetite 
0.676 
Code of ethics 0.673 
Human resource policy 0.527 
Organization structure 0.803 
BOD’s oversight 0.540 
Control environment 0.875 
 
All Cronbach’s Alpha values, except BOD’s oversight and human resource policy are between 
0.673-0.875. These alpha values mean that the internal reliability of the variables is acceptable. 
Therefore, a combination of the items into one variable is supported and will subsequently be used in 
the regression analysis. Further information about the internal reliability testing and exact numbers 
and what items have been combined can be found in Appendix 3. 
Human resource policy has Cronbach’s alpha 0.527; therefore, it is reviewed to consider which item 
within this measure should be removed. It is realized that question 5.1 should be removed to increase 
Cronbach’s alpha to 0,746. This is reasonable because question 5.1 (Does your organization have a 
formal human resource policy?) is dummy variable, almost all respondents answered Yes, therefore it is 
not significantly informative.  
Another measure that has alpha less than 0.6 is Board of Directors’ oversight, which has alpha 0.54. 
When reviewed the items within this measure, the answer of question 7.2 seems to not be in line with 
answers for other questions within the same measure. However, communication between audit committee 
and management is important for building a trusting relationship between these parties (IIA, 2011). It 
requires an openly and frequent communication and requires the assist of audit committee in 
implementing their roles of both advisory and monitoring. Audit committee must “carefully review 
information received” and question management when they need to clarify the information (IIA, 2011). It 
is an important item to measure Board of Directors ‘oversight. In addition, when alpha is more than 0.5, it 
is not an unacceptable level. Therefore, item 7.2 should not be removed from this measure and the items 
in this measure will be treated separately when running the regression test.  
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5.3.3 Correlation 
It is necessary to know how variables are correlated both between dependent variable and independent 
variables and among independent variables themselves. To be able to understand this relationship, 
correlation matrix is used; the level of correlation is presented by Pearson’s score, which shows the 
strength of the relationship. This score is ranged from -1 to + 1. Negative value means the opposite 
direction in the relationship, it means if one variable increases, the other has a tendency to decrease and 
vise verse; whereas, positive value means that if one variable increases, the other has also tendency to 
increase.  
About the significant level, the statistics level of 0.05 is chosen for the test. It means if p value is less than 
0.05, the null hypothesis will be rejected, there is correlation between variables. Five percent chosen 
means that this research accepts that 5% risk of the research shows the correlations between variables but 
it may not shows in the population. However, the level of 1% is also shown if the strength of correlation 
is exceptional. The variable used in correlation is the average of items of each measure. For example, 
AVG2.1-2.3 is average value of the score of the answers for questions from 2.1 to 2.3 and so on. The 
average value is chosen to be a presented variable for each factor because the numbers of questions in 
each measure are different, to avoid the effect by the numbers of questions, the average value is chosen.  
Table 5.11 shows the result of correlation test: 
Table	  5.11	  –	  Correlations	  before	  PCA 
Correlations 
 
AVG 
2.1-2.3 
AVG  
3.1-3.3 
AVG  
4.1-4.5 
AVG 
5.2-5.3 
AVG 
6.1-6.3 
AVG 
7.1-7.4 
AVG 2.1-
2.3 
Pearson Correlation 1 .465** .465** .236** .358** .483** 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 
N 143 143 143 143 143 143 
AVG 3.1-
3.3 
Pearson Correlation .465** 1 .779** .280** .571** .347** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 143 143 143 143 143 143 
AVG 4.1-
4.5 
Pearson Correlation .465** .779** 1 .354** .589** .511** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 143 143 143 143 143 143 
AVG 5.2-
5.3 
Pearson Correlation .236** .280** .354** 1 .684** .428** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .002 .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 143 143 143 143 143 143 
AVG 
6.1-6.3 
Pearson Correlation .358** .571** .589** .684** 1 .389** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 143 143 143 143 143 143 
AVG 7.1-
7.4 
Pearson Correlation .483** .347** .511** .428** .389** 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 143 143 143 143 143 143 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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This table shows that p value of all cases less than 0.05 therefore there is a correlation between variables, 
however, it is noticed that independent variables also have correlation among them;  further steps should 
be done to implement regression test.  
5.3.4 Convert data to principal component 
The result of the regression test will be biased if the independent variables has correlation with others. 
This multi-collinearity should be removed before the regression test. In this case, principal component 
analysis method is applied. Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical method that converts 
correlated variables into a set of variable that are linearly uncorrelated by using uses an orthogonal 
transformation (Shlens, 2003). In this case, the number of principal components is the same the number of 
original variables; it means that the set of principal components is 5 variables. The principal component 
will be calculated based on R program. Each principal component variable does not have a meaning; 
however, it does not change the nature of the data. This method only helps remove the multi-collinearity 
when performing the regression test. Because the principal components use the eigenvectors of the 
covariance matrix, they are now parametric. This method changes the XY coordinate system to the new 
coordinate system (UV coordinate system), as illustrated by the following graphs:  
 
Figure	  5.1	  -­‐	  Coordinate	  system	  
Source: (Imperial college London, 2015) 
At the first graph, with the coordinate XY, the data is correlated, however, for the second graph with a 
new coordinate UV, the data is not correlated. The data set was changed to principal component as 
following table:  
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Table	  5.12	  –	  PCA	  transformation 
 
With this new principal component set, the data was re-calculated to a new data set that can be used to run 
the regression test. Instead of having the set of original variables from X1 to X5 (X1 is AVG1 (average of 
the answers from question 3.1-3.3, X2 is AVG2 (average of the answers from questions 4.1 to 4.5) and so 
on), the new set of variables are PC1 to PC5. Notice that each of new principal component variable will 
consists of all original variables in a formula that run by R program and presented in the PCA 
transformation table above. Excel formula is used to re-calculate all the data based on the result by R 
software as presented in table PCA transformation. After running the regression test, if at least there is a 
correlation between one of the principal component with the possibility of detecting fraud (Y), in 
regression test with PCA in the regression model, each PCA variable is replaced by the original variables 
using rotation matrix to find out the correlation between each of original variable and the possibility of 
detecting fraud.  
5.3.5  Regression test and conclusion for hypothesis 1 
H1: There is a correlation between internal control environment and the perceived possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud.  
After replacing the data with new data set, to ensure that there is no correlation between independent 
variables, the Pearson’s test is conducted; the following table shows the result of Pearson’s test: 
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Table	  5.13	  –	  Correlation	  after	  PCA 
Correlations 
 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 
PC1 Pearson Correlation 1 -.021 -.265** -.147 -.110 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .806 .001 .080 .191 
N 143 143 143 143 143 
PC2 Pearson Correlation -.021 1 .101 -.202* -.224** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .806  .228 .016 .007 
N 143 143 143 143 143 
PC3 Pearson Correlation -.265** .101 1 .080 -.227** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .228  .340 .006 
N 143 143 143 143 143 
PC4 Pearson Correlation -.147 -.202* .080 1 .082 
Sig. (2-tailed) .080 .016 .340  .329 
N 143 143 143 143 143 
PC5 Pearson Correlation -.110 -.224** -.227** .082 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .191 .007 .006 .329  
N 143 143 143 143 143 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The result of Pearson’s test shows that all p value are more than 0.05 (except p value of correlation 
between PC1 and PC3 is less than 0.05), therefore we do not reject null hypothesis. This indicates that 
there is no sufficient evidence about the correlation between independent variables. Although there is 
correlation between PC1 and PC3, the Pearson’s score is very small (-0.265) which indicates that the 
correlation is very weak. Therefore, the new set of variables (PC1, PC5) can be used to run the regression 
test.  The following table so the result of regression test (the detail of the test will be found in the 
appendix 4) 
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Table	  5.14	  –	  Regression	  test 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.288 .074  30.997 .000 
PC1 .028 .048 .052 .583 .561 
PC2 .026 .057 .041 .464 .643 
PC3 -.020 .053 -.035 -.382 .703 
PC4 .086 .050 .151 1.728 .086 
PC5 .012 .060 .018 .196 .845 
a. Dependent Variable: Y 
 
The result of the test shows that p value of each variable is more than 0.05, which indicate that there is no 
correlation between any of the variable to the possibility of detecting fraud, or in other words, variables 
cannot explain the change in the possibility of detecting fraud.  
Therefore, the hypothesis 1 is rejected; there is no correlation between internal control environment 
and the perceived possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud.	  
5.4 Statistics test results and hypothesis 2 analysis  
Hypothesis 2 related to the question 1.1 and question 8, of which, question 1.1 asks about the years of 
experience of internal auditors and question 8 asks about their ranking on the importance of factors 
influencing possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
H2: There is difference in views on the importance of different factors influencing the possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who have different experience. 
This section is divided into two parts. Firstly, to test if there is any different views on the importance of 
different factors influencing the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who 
have different experience, cross tabulation is used in this research to have an overview on description of 
the data. In this cross tabulation the internal auditors with different experience will be organized in four 
groups, of which, the higher the number of the group, the more experience the internal auditors has. 
Internal auditor groups will be presented in rows and the other variable will be presented in columns. A 
bar-chart is also used to assist a visual view on the pattern of data. Secondly, a Kruskal Wallis test is 
conducted to compare median of ranking the importance of the factors between these groups of internal 
auditors. The result of this test will help to conclude whether there are any different views on the 
importance of factors that influencing on possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
5.4.1  Data description  
Top management control philosophy and risk appetite 
Table 5.15 shows how internal auditors with different experience ranks management control philosophy 
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and risk appetite as one of the most important factors that influence the possibility of internal auditor in 
detecting fraud. The details of the test will be shown in percentage attached in the Appendix 5. In this 
table we can see that internal auditors who have more than 10 years of experiences tend to think that top 
management risk appetite and control philosophy is the most important factor, which 18 people chose this 
option accounting for 37% of internal auditors who have more than 10 years of experience. It is 
interesting that the group of internal auditors who have 5 to 10 years of experience have very diversified 
opinions, of which, 21.3% think that top management control philosophy and risk appetite is the least 
important factor, whereas, 29.8% think that this is the most important factor, the rest ranked this factor 
between 2nd and 4th position. Respondents who have experience from 2 years to less than 5 years think 
differently which a majority of them (38.7%) think that top management risk appetite and control 
philosophy is least important. People who have work experience of less than 2 years seem to not have the 
same ideas. The bar-chart is also used to assist the visual of the data. 
Table	  5.15	  -­‐	  Yrs	  of	  Experience	  *	  Management	  Risk	  Appetite	  &	  Control	  Philosophy	  (Crosstabulation)	   
Count   
 
Top management risk appetite and control philosophy 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Yrs of experience 1 4 6 1 2 4 17 
2 12 5 4 6 4 31 
3 10 9 9 5 14 47 
4 8 9 6 7 18 48 
Total 34 29 20 20 40 143 
 
 
Figure	  5.2	  -­‐	  Bar	  chart	  (Years	  of	  Experience	  &	  Management	  Philosophy)	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 Code of ethics  
 
Table 5.16 shows how internal auditors with different experience rank code of ethics as one of the most 
important factors that influence the possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. The detail of the test 
shown in percentage will be attached in the Appendix 5. In this table we can see that within each group, 
there is no clear tendency of which position they rank, i.e., there is no tendency that most of them think 
code of ethics is most important or least important, or in other words, their opinion is much diversified. 
For example, among internal auditors who have more than 10 years of experience, 24 internal auditors 
who account for 50% of this group, think that the code of ethics is the least important factor (ranked 
position 1 and 2) whereas, 37.4% think that the code of ethics is an important factor (ranked position 4 
and 5), the rest put the importance of this position in the middle (ranked position 3). It can be explained 
by the fact that some internal auditors focus on the internal control system rather than code of ethics, so 
they may have diversified individual opinions about the code of ethics. The bar-chart is also used to assist 
the visual of the data. 
Table	  5.16	  -­‐	  Yrs	  of	  Experience	  *	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  (	  Crosstabulation) 
 
Code of ethics 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Yrs of experience 1 1 3 3 7 3 17 
2 2 8 4 14 3 31 
3 7 17 6 12 5 47 
4 2 22 6 15 3 48 
Total 12 50 19 48 14 143 
 
Figure	  5.3	  -­‐	  Bar	  chart	  (Years	  of	  Experience	  &	  Code	  of	  Ethics)	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Human resource policy  
Table 5.17 shows how internal auditors with different experiences rank organization structure as one of 
the most important factors that influence the possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. The detail 
test shown in percentage will be attached in the Appendix 5. In this table we can see that internal auditors 
who have experience of more than 10 years tend to think that human resource policy is the least important 
factor. Of this group, 54.1% consider human resource policy as the least important factor (ranked 1st and 
2nd position for least important factor). It is similar with the group of internal auditors who have 
experience of more than 5 years but less than 10 years. In contrast, the group of internal auditors who 
have experience from 2 years to less than 5 years and the group of internal auditors who have experience 
of less than 2 years shows that there is no tendency of how they rank human resource policy, their 
opinions are much diversified. This can be explained by the following: it requires more time and 
experience to understand and assess the human resource policy of an organization. The bar-chart is also 
used to assist the visual of the data.  
Table	  5.17	  -­‐	  Yrs	  of	  Experience	  *	  Human	  Resource	  Policy	  (Crosstabulation)	  
Count   
 
Human resource policy 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Yrs of experience 1 5 5 1 1 5 17 
2 9 6 3 3 10 31 
3 17 10 7 6 7 47 
4 16 10 7 6 9 48 
Total 47 31 18 16 31 143 
 
 
Figure	  5.4-­‐	  Bar	  chart	  (Years	  of	  Experience	  &	  Human	  Resource	  Policy)	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Organization structure 
Table 5.18 shows how internal auditors with different experience rank organization structure as one of the 
most important factors that influence the possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. The detail test 
shown in percentage will be attached in the Appendix 5. In this table we can see that internal auditors 
who have experience for more than 10 years tend to think that organization structure is the most important 
factor. Of this group, 79.2% ranked organization structure as important factor (ranked from 3th position to 
highest important position). It is similar to the group of internal auditors who have more than 5 years of 
experience but less than 10 years of experience and similar the group of internal auditors who have more 
than 2 years of experience but less than 5 years of experience. It can be seen that internal auditors who 
have more experience evaluate organization structure higher than internal auditors who have less 
experience. The bar-chart is also used to assist the visual of the data. 
Table	  5.18	  -­‐	  Yrs	  of	  Experience	  *	  Organization	  Structure	  (Crosstabulation)	  
Count   
 
The organization structure 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Yrs of experience 1 4 2 3 6 2 17 
2 4 8 5 6 8 31 
3 8 4 9 17 9 47 
4 8 2 12 14 12 48 
Total 24 16 29 43 31 143 
 
 
Figure	  5.5	  -­‐	  Bar	  chart	  (Years	  of	  Experience	  &	  Organization	  Structure)	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Board of Directors’s oversight 
In the table 5.19, we can see that within each group, there is no clear tendency of which position they 
rank, i.e., there is no tendency that most of them think that Board of Directors’ oversight is important or 
less important, or in other words, their opinion is much diversified. For example, among internal auditors 
who have more than 10 years of experience, 19 internal auditors, accounting for 39.5% of this group, 
think that Board of Directors ‘oversight is the least important factor (ranked position 1 and 2) whereas, 12 
internal auditors, account for 25% think that Board of Directors ‘oversight is an important factor (ranked 
position 4 and 5), the rest put the importance of this position in the middle (ranked position 3). The bar-
chart is also used to assist the visual of the data. The detail test is found in Appendix 5. 
Table	  5.19	  -­‐	  Yrs	  of	  experience	  *	  The	  Board	  of	  Directors	  oversight	  Crosstabulation	  
Count   
 
The Board of Directors oversight 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Yrs of experience 1 3 1 9 1 3 17 
2 4 4 15 2 6 31 
3 5 7 16 7 12 47 
4 14 5 17 6 6 48 
Total 26 17 57 16 27 143 
 
 
  
Figure	  5.6	  -­‐	  Bar	  chart	  (Years	  of	  Experience	  &	  Board	  of	  Director’s	  Oversight)	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5.4.2  Kruskal Wallis test  
Although the data table and the bar-chart show that there seems to be a difference between groups of 
internal auditors in their ranking of the importance of each internal control environment factor. However, 
to have an exact conclusion, tests of Kruskal Wallis are conducted. Kruskal Wallis was chosen instead of 
ANOVA test because of the nature of the research’s data. Due to the small sample size, the data has the 
nature of non-parametric test; therefore, a non-parametric test should be used. This test will use the group 
variable of years of experience and test variable in the ranking the importance of each internal control 
environment factor. Kruskal Wallis test for a difference in distributions (medians) with two hypotheses as 
following: 
Ho: M1=M2=M3=M4 
Ha: Not all medians are equal 
Significant level: alpha = 0.05 
Kruskal Wallis test for years of experience and management control philosophy and risk appetite 
The following table shows the result of the test:  
Table	  5.20-­‐	  Kruskal	  Wallis	  test	  for	  Years	  of	  Experience	  &	  Management	  Control	  Philosophy	  and	  Risk	  Appetite	  	  	  
Test Statisticsa,b 
 
Top 
management 
risk appetite and 
control 
philosophy 
Chi-Square 6.639 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .084 
 
 The result of this test shows that p value =0.084> 0.05, mean there is not sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis or in other words, there is no significant difference among the four groups of internal 
auditors by years of experience in ranking the importance of top management risk appetite and control 
philosophy.  
 Kruskal Wallis test for years of experience and code of ethics 
The following table shows the result of the test:  
Table	  5.21-­‐	  Kruskal	  Wallis	  Test	  for	  Years	  of	  Experience	  and	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  	  
Test Statisticsa,b 
 Code of ethics 
Chi-Square 5.742 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .125 
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a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Yrs of 
experience 
The result of this test shows that p value =0.125> 0.05, mean there is not sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis or in other words, there is no significant difference among the four groups of internal 
auditors by years of experience in ranking the importance of code of ethics. 
Kruskal Wallis test for years of experience and human resource policy 
Table	  5.22-­‐	  Kruskal	  Wallis	  Test	  for	  Years	  of	  Experience	  and	  Human	  Resource	  Policy	  	  
 
Test Statisticsa,b 
 
Human 
resource policy 
Chi-Square 1.634 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .652 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Yrs of 
experience 
The result of this test shows that p value =0.652 > 0.05, mean there is not sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis or in other words, there is no significant difference among the four groups of internal 
auditors by years of experience in ranking the importance of human resource policy. 
Kruskal Wallis test for years of experience and the organization structure 
 
Table	  5.23-­‐	  Kruskal	  Wallis	  Test	  for	  Years	  of	  Experience	  and	  Organization	  Structure	  
Test Statisticsa,b 
 
The 
organization 
structure 
Chi-Square 1.278 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .734 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Yrs of 
experience 
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The result of this test shows that p value =0.734> 0.05, mean there is not sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis or in other words, there is no significant difference among the four groups of internal 
auditors by years of experience in ranking the importance of organization structure.  
Kruskal Wallis test for years of experience and the Board of Directors oversight 
Table	  5.24-­‐	  Kruskal	  Wallis	  Test	  for	  Years	  of	  Experience	  and	  Board	  of	  Director’s	  Oversight	  	  
Test Statisticsa,b 
 
The Board of 
Directors 
oversight 
Chi-Square 4.703 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. .195 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Yrs of 
experience 
The result of this test shows that p value =0.195> 0.05, mean there is not sufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis or in other words, there is no significant difference among the four groups of internal 
auditors by years of experience in ranking the importance of Board of Director’s oversight. 
5.4.3  Hypothesis 2 conclusion  
The crosstab analysis shows that there seems to be a difference in views on the importance of different 
factors influencing the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who have 
different experience. For the top management factor, the group of internal auditors who have more than 
10 years of experience tends to think this is the most important factor, whereas, the two groups of internal 
auditors who have more than 2 years of experience but less than 10 years think that this factor is not 
important and the group of internal auditors who have less than 2 years of experience have a diversified 
opinion. The groups of auditors who have more experience think that organization structure is an 
important factor whereas the groups of internal auditors who have less experience think that organization 
structure is a less important factor. In contrast, the groups of auditors who have more experience think 
that human resource is a less important factor whereas the groups of internal auditors who have less 
experience think that human resource is an important factor. Factors of code of ethics and oversight of 
Board of directors show a much diversified opinion in all the groups of internal auditors.  
  Although there seems to be a difference in views on which factor is the most important in influencing the 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst internal auditors who have different experience, 
in the sample in crosstab, Kruskal Wallis tests shows that with the confident of 95% there is no significant 
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difference between the group of internal auditors by years of experience in their ranking of each internal 
control environment factor. Therefore, the conclusion for the hypothesis 2 is:  
  There is no significant difference in views on the importance of different factors influencing the 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who have different experience 
5.5 Statistics test results and hypothesis 3 analysis 
Hypothesis 3 relates to question 1.1 and question 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, of which, the average of the answers for 
question 2.1 to 2.3 will be treated as a representative variable. The reason for this treatment has been 
discussed in section 5.3.1.1.  
H3: There is a correlation between the importance of different factors influencing the perception of 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and experience of internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
To test this correlation, Pearson’s test will be conducted, notice that it is different from hypothesis 1. 
When trying to figure out if there is any correlation between control environment that includes five 
independent variable with one dependent variable, a regression test should be used; in this hypothesis, 
there is only a need to find the correlation between two variables, therefore, a simple test should be 
applied; in this case Pearson’s test is applied. The following table shows the result of Pearson’s test:  
Table	  5.25	  -­‐	  Pearson’s	  Test	  for	  Hypothesis	  3	  
Correlations 
 SUM 2.1-2.3 Q1.1 
SUM 2.1-2.3 Pearson Correlation 1 -.156 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .063 
N 143 143 
Q1.1 Pearson Correlation -.156 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .063  
N 143 143 
 
Ho: r= 0 (there is no correlation between variables)   
Ha: r≠0 (there is correlation between variables) 
In this Pearson’s test, the p value is 0.63, which is more than 0.05 indicates that it cannot reject null 
hypothesis or there is no correlation between variables.  
Conclusion for hypothesis 3: There is no a correlation between the importance of different factors 
influencing the perception of possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and experience of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud 
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5.6  Statistics test results and hypothesis 4 analysis  
Hypothesis 4 relates to question 1.2 and question 8, of which, question 1.2 asks about the view of internal 
auditors on their role and question 8 asks about their ranking on the importance of factors influencing 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
H4: There is difference view on the importance of different factors influencing the possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud among auditors who have different view in their roles.  
This section is divided into two parts. Firstly, to test if there is any different view amongst auditors who 
have different view on their role about the factors influencing the possibility of internal auditors in 
detecting fraud, cross tabulation is used in this research. This is conducted in order to have an overview 
on the description of the data. In this cross tabulation the internal auditors with different view on their role 
is in six groups, of which, the higher the number of the group, the higher the importance of detecting 
fraud in the internal auditors’ role. Internal auditor groups will be presented in rows and the other variable 
will be presented in columns. Secondly, a Kruskal Wallis test is conducted to compare the median of 
ranking the importance of the factors between these groups of internal auditors. The result of this test will 
help conclude whether there are any difference in views on the importance of different factors influencing 
the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud among auditors who have different view in their 
roles. 
5.6.1 Data description  
Top management control philosophy and risk appetite 
Table 5.26 shows how internal auditors with different view in their roles rank management control 
philosophy and risk appetite as one of the most important factors that influence the possibility of internal 
auditor in detecting fraud. The detail test shown in percentage will be attached in the Appendix 6. In this 
table we can see that most of the internal auditors who consider the most important role of their work is 
detecting fraud think that top management control philosophy and risk appetite is the least important 
factor. This is based on 11/18 people who chose this option 1 and 2, accounting for 61.1% of internal 
auditors in this group. It is interesting that the group of internal auditors who consider detecting fraud as 
the least priority in their work think that top management risk appetite and control philosophy is really an 
important factor with 75% of the people in this group ranking this factor as the most important factor; 
25% of people in this group think that this factor is moderate, whereas no one thought that this factor is 
the least important.  The tendency on which this group ranked this factor is not clear, for example, in 
group 2 (detecting fraud is the second least important task), 16 people think that this factor is less 
important, 13 people think that this factor is rather important and 5 people think that this factor is 
moderate.  
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Table	  5.26	  -­‐	  Crosstab	  for	  Hypothesis	  4	  (Management	  Risk	  Appetite	  &	  Control	  Philosophy)	  
Crosstab 
Count   
 
Top management risk appetite and control philosophy 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 0 0 1 1 2 4 
2 5 11 5 2 11 34 
3 13 6 5 7 7 38 
4 7 6 5 4 9 31 
5 2 2 3 3 8 18 
6 7 4 1 3 3 18 
Total 34 29 20 20 40 143 
 
Code of ethics  
Table 5.27 shows how internal auditors with different views on their roles rank code of ethics as one of 
the most important factors that influence the possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. The detail 
test shown in percentage will be attached in Appendix 6.  In this table we can see that within each group, 
there is no clear tendency of which position they rank, i.e., there is no tendency that most of them think 
code of ethics is important or less important; their opinion is much diversified. For example, among 
internal auditors who consider detecting fraud as the most important task, 8 internal auditors account for 
44.4% of this group who think that code of ethics is the least important factor (ranked position 1 and 2) 
whereas 9 people, accounting for 50%, think that code of ethics is an important factor (ranked position 4 
and 5), and one person put the importance of this position in the middle (ranked position 3).  
Table	  5.27	  -­‐	  Crosstab	  for	  Hypothesis	  4	  (Code	  of	  Ethics)	  
Crosstab 
Count   
 
Code of ethics 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 1 2 1 0 0 4 
2 4 11 3 10 6 34 
3 2 11 8 14 3 38 
4 3 11 4 11 2 31 
5 1 8 2 7 0 18 
6 1 7 1 6 3 18 
Total 12 50 19 48 14 143 
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Human resource policy  
Table 5.28 shows how internal auditors with different views in their roles rank organization structure as 
one of the most important factors that influence on the possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. 
The detail test shown in percentage will be attached in Appendix 6. In this table we can see that within 
each group, there is no clear tendency of which position they rank, i.e., there is no tendency that most of 
them think human resource policy is important or least important, or in other words, their opinion is much 
diversified. For example, among internal auditors who consider detecting fraud as the most important 
task, 9 internal auditors, account for 50% of this group, think that human resource is less important factor 
(ranked position 1 and 2) whereas, 8 people, accounting for 44.4% think that human resource is an 
important factor (ranked position 4 and 5), one person put the importance of this position in the middle 
(ranked position 3).  
Table	  5.28	  -­‐	  Crosstab	  for	  Hypothesis	  4	  (Human	  Resource	  Policy)	  
Crosstab 
Count   
 
Human resource policy 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 1 2 1 0 0 4 
2 13 6 4 3 8 34 
3 10 9 5 4 10 38 
4 9 8 7 2 5 31 
5 7 4 0 4 3 18 
6 7 2 1 3 5 18 
Total 47 31 18 16 31 143 
 
 
Organization structure 
Table 5.29 shows how internal auditors with different experience rank organization structure as one of the 
most important factors that influence the possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. The detail test 
shown in percentage will be attached in Appendix 6. Internal auditors who consider the most important 
role of their work is detecting fraud think that organization structure is an important factor, in this group, 
5 internal auditors, account for 27.8% of this group, think that organization structure is the least important 
factor (ranked position 1 and 2). Eight people, accounting for 44.5% think that organization structure is an 
important factor (ranked position 4 and 5) and 5 people put the importance of this position in the middle 
(ranked position 3). This tendency can be seen in the group 1, 2, 3 and 4 as shown in the below table.  
	  
	  
	  
	   	  
64	  
	  
	  
Table	  5.29-­‐	  Crosstab	  for	  Hypothesis	  4	  (Organization	  Structure)	  
Crosstab 
Count   
 
The organization structure 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 0 0 0 3 1 4 
2 7 2 7 12 6 34 
3 7 7 6 10 8 38 
4 4 3 5 10 9 31 
5 4 1 6 3 4 18 
6 2 3 5 5 3 18 
Total 24 16 29 43 31 143 
 
Board of Directors’s oversight 
In the table 5.30, it is interesting to see that in almost all groups, the percentage of people who ranked 
Board of Directors’ oversight as moderate factor is highest. The tendency about how each groups thinks 
about Board of Director’s oversight factor is unclear.  
Table	  5.30	  -­‐	  Crosstab	  for	  Hypothesis	  4	  (Board	  of	  Director’s	  Oversight)	  
Crosstab 
Count   
 
The Board of Directors oversight 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 2 0 1 0 1 4 
2 5 4 15 7 3 34 
3 6 5 14 3 10 38 
4 8 3 10 4 6 31 
5 4 3 7 1 3 18 
6 1 2 10 1 4 18 
Total 26 17 57 16 27 143 
 
5.6.2  Kruskal Wallis test  
Although the data table shows that there seems to be a difference in views on the importance of different 
factors influencing the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who have 
different views of their role. However, to have an exact conclusion, the test of Kruskal Wallis was 
conducted. Kruskal Wallis was chosen instead of ANOVA test because of the nature of the research’s 
data. Due to the small sample size, the data has a nature of non-parametric test; therefore, a non-
parametric test should be used. This test will use the group variable is years of experience and test 
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variable is ranking the importance of each internal control environment factor. The details of the test are 
found in Appendix 6. The Kruskal Wallis tests a difference in distributions (medians) with two 
hypotheses as following: 
Ho: M1=M2=M3=M4=M5=M6 
Ha: Not all medians are equal 
Significant level: alpha = 0,05 
The following table shows the result of Kruskal Wallis test:  
Table	  5.31-­‐	  Kruskal	  Wallis	  Test	  for	  Hypothesis	  4	  
Test Statisticsa,b 
 
Top 
management 
risk appetite 
and control 
philosophy Code of ethics 
Human 
resource policy 
The 
organization 
structure 
The Board of 
Directors 
oversight 
Chi-Square 10.144 4.189 1.472 4.123 2.379 
df 5 5 5 5 5 
Asymp. Sig. .071 .523 .916 .532 .795 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Detect fraud within the organization 
 
The result of this test shows that all p value > 0.05, mean there is not sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis or in other words, there is no significant difference amongst the six groups of internal auditors 
by perception of their roles in ranking the importance of organization structure.  
5.6.3   Hypothesis 4 conclusion: 
The crosstab analysis shows that there seems to be different views on the importance of different factors 
influencing the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst auditors who have different 
view of their role. For top management factor, most of the internal auditors, who consider the most 
important role of their work is detecting fraud, think that top management control philosophy and risk 
appetite is the least important factor. The groups of internal auditors who consider that detecting fraud is 
the least priority in their work think that top management risk appetite and control philosophy is really an 
important factor. For organization structure factor, in almost all of the groups, there is a tendency that 
internal auditors think organization structure is an important factor. However, for the code of ethics, 
human resource and Board of Directors’ oversight, there it is not clear on the tendency within each group 
of internal auditors.  
Although there seems to be different views about which factor is the most important in influencing the 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud amongst internal auditors who have different experience, 
in the sample in crosstab, Kruskal Wallis tests shows that with the confident of 95% there is no significant 
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difference between the group of internal auditors by perception of their roles in their ranking each internal 
control environment factor. Therefore, the conclusion for the hypothesis 4 is:  
There is no significant difference view on the importance of different factors influencing the possibility 
of internal auditors in detecting fraud among auditors who have different view in their roles. 
5.7 Statistics test results and hypothesis 5 analysis  
Hypothesis 5 related to the question 1.2 and question 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, of which, the average of the answers 
for the question 2.1 to 2.3 will be treated as a representative variable. The reason for this treatment has 
been discussed in section 5.3.1.1.  
H5: There is a correlation between the importance of different factors influencing the perception of 
possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and perception of the internal auditor’s role in 
connection with detecting fraud. 
To test this correlation, Pearson’s test will be conducted, notice that this is different from hypothesis 1., If 
trying to figure out whether there is any correlation between control environment which includes five 
independent variable with one dependent variable, a regression test should be used; in this hypothesis, 
there was only a need to find the correlation between two variables, therefore, a simple test should be 
applied; in this case Pearson’s test is applied. The following table shows the result of Pearson’s test: 
Table	  5.32	  -­‐	  Pearson’s	  Test	  for	  Hypothesis	  5	  	  
Correlations 
 SUM 2.1-2.3 Q1.2 
SUM 2.1-2.3 Pearson Correlation 1 .135 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .108 
N 143 143 
Q1.2 Pearson Correlation .135 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .108  
N 143 143 
 
Ho: r= 0 (there is no correlation between variables)   
Ha: r≠0 (there is correlation between variables) 
In this Pearson’s test, the p value is 0.108 which is more than 0.05 indicates that it cannot reject null 
hypothesis or there is no correlation between variables.  
Conclusion for hypothesis 5: There is a no correlation between the importance of different factors 
influencing the perception of possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and perception of the 
internal auditor’s role in connection with detecting fraud. 
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5.8 Conclusion  
Statistics test and analysis results show that there is no correlation between the internal control 
environment and possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud, or in other words, internal control 
environment does not have an influence on the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud. In other 
words, the internal control environment cannot explain the possibility of internal auditors in detecting 
fraud. Although previous researchers found that internal control environment and its elements are very 
important and have a connection with fraud occurrence within organizations, there is no previous research 
on the correlation of internal control environment and possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. 
Therefore, this result will help to contribute to the research landscape.  
This research tries to find out if there is any correlation between the years of experience of internal 
auditors and the perception of possibility in detecting fraud and if there is any correlation between the 
perception of internal auditors in their role and the perception of possibility in detecting fraud, however, 
the answers for both of these concerns is that there is no correlation.  
There is no significant difference in the opinions about which factor is important in influencing the 
possibility of detecting fraud amongst internal auditors who have different years of experience. Similarly, 
there is no significant difference in the opinion about which factor is important in influencing on 
possibility of detecting fraud amongst internal auditors who have different perception of their role in 
connection with detecting fraud.   
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Chapter 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
6.1 Theoretical Implications 
This thesis tries to find out whether internal control environment influences the possibility of internal 
auditors in detecting fraud. To answer this concern a sample of internal auditors who are members of 
the IIA were selected. The questions presented to the respondents were based on COSO and previous 
researches; however, they were adopted to make it suitable to this study. The structure of the 
questionnaire is based on the definition and guidelines of COSO on the control environment.  
Five hypotheses were developed in order to arrive at a conclusion on whether or not the internal 
control environment influences the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud and to 
understand more about internal auditors’ opinions on the internal control environment factors. A 
correlation and regression analysis of the five hypotheses were performed and tested to determine 
whether they can be accepted or rejected. The first hypothesis proves that there is no correlation 
between internal control environment and possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. Previous 
research has proved the importance of control environment to the internal control system and fraud 
occurrence as presented in chapter 2. However, there is no previous research on the correlation between 
internal control environment and the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud. The result of this 
research suggests that internal control environment although having an influence on internal control 
system and fraud occurrence within organization, should not be used to explain the possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud.  
There has been controversy over the internal auditor’s role to detect and prevent fraud as some argue that 
they lack independence, which could also impede their objectivity in their role. Roussy (2013) conducted 
a qualitative study based on the role theory and the model of coping with role conflict in which she 
collected data during interviews with 42 internal auditors in 13 public sectors in Quebec. From her 
research she concluded that internal auditors have developed a nuanced conception of independence in 
order to be able to perform while working with executives at their organizations. She also concluded that 
the internal auditor does not fit the governance mechanism role expected by the regulatory as her research 
shows that internal auditors are more concerned with their role in aiding top management and the 
organization (Roussy, 2013).  
Kawashima (2007) expresses skepticism in the internal auditor’s role in consultancy. She argues that 
when the internal auditors offer advice to management, management eventually sees the internal auditor 
as a part of their department. Hence, the independence required by the IIA code of ethics is compromised 
(Kawashima, 2007).  In addition Kawashima says that this also compromises the independency required 
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from the internal auditor in providing the audit committee an effective and objective assurance of their 
oversight of the firm’s internal controls, policies, procedures, and audits (Kawashima, 2007).   
The internal auditors work within organizations exposing them to the politics within the company, which 
could result in having an influence in their work. Hence, they work in a rather weak autonomy (Nickell & 
Roberts, 2012).  Everett and Tremblay argue that the morals that internal auditors are to adopt are rather 
ambiguous and possibly conflicting (Everett & Tremblay, 2013). Based on Everett and Tremblay’s 
findings, Roberts and Nickell (2012) state that the internal auditors work is affected by the hypocrisy of 
the firm. Furthermore, they suggest that society is willing to justify the stretched level of organized 
hypocrisy found in the internal auditor’s role in both consultancy and assurance (Nickell & Roberts, 
2012). In addition, there are also people who question the effectiveness of audit. Though it is not in 
specific to internal auditors and/or their role in detecting fraud, Powers (1999) provides his skepticism on 
the auditing function as a whole. He describes auditing as simply ‘rationalized rituals’ used to create 
organizational legitimacy. He argues that internal auditors have increased their focus on making sure that 
the controls or auditable as oppose of verifying that they are effective (Power , 1999). 
Therefore, the result of the research although somehow surprising, is not in contrast with previous 
research, especially, the research on factors influencing the possibility of internal auditors in detecting 
fraud. It may be subjective factors, such as competence of internal auditors, independence, and 
objectivity of internal auditors, that determines the possibility of internal auditor in detecting fraud. For 
example, if the control environment is weak, but the independence of internal auditor is ensured and 
they have competence to perform their work, the possibility of detecting fraud increases. In another 
case where control environment is strong but internal auditors’ lack independence or competence the 
possibility of detecting fraud may reduce. Therefore, this research suggests that there may be other 
factors that can explain the possibility of detecting fraud but internal control environment.  
This study was carried out with a sample of internal auditors who are member of IIA in US. Thereby, 
generalization of the result to all internal auditors who are member of IIA in US may be possible. 
However, it must be prudent to generalize the result to the US or in global scale. The scale of sample 
size may not be large enough for these large populations.  
Although the research of Bonner and Lewis (Bonner & Lewis, 1990), Ashton and Brown (1980), and 
Bedard (1989) to find out if there is any difference in knowledge between experienced auditors and less 
experienced auditors, this research shows that there is no correlation between the years of experience of 
internal auditors and the perception of possibility in detecting fraud. It also shows that there is no 
significant difference in the opinion of which factor is the most important in influencing the possibility of 
detecting fraud amongst internal auditors with different years of experience.  
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In regards to the internal auditor’s perception on their role, role theory explains that different perception 
of their role will lead to different thinking and actions between individuals. Research of Ahmad and 
Taylor (2009) found that role ambiguity and role conflict have a negative effect on the performance of the 
internal auditors, however, this research found that there is no correlation between the perception of 
internal auditors in their role and the perception of possibility in detecting fraud and there is no significant 
difference in the opinion on which factor is the important in influencing the possibility of detecting fraud 
amongst internal auditors who have different perception of their role in connection with detecting fraud.   
 
 In short, our contributions for the research landscape are: 
Ø Internal control environment has no correlation with the possibility of internal auditors in 
detecting fraud. This result does not contrast with previous researches on the importance of 
internal control environment and the relationship between internal control environment and fraud 
occurrence. This research supplements previous research in this field in the way that although 
internal control environment is important, there is no evidence that shows that the control 
environment can decide the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud. Alternatively, 
internal auditors perceive that with a good control environment no fraud is supposed to happen. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to detect fraud.  
Ø There is no correlation between the years of experience of internal auditors and the perception of 
possibility in detecting fraud. In addition, there is no significant differences in the view of internal 
auditors who have different years of experience having different opinion on which factor is the 
most important in influencing the possibility of detecting fraud. This is somehow contrast with 
previous research in that there is a difference in knowledge between experienced auditors and less 
experienced auditors. However, we argue that knowledge and perception is two different things. 
Due to no previous research on the difference in perception between experienced auditors and 
less experienced auditors, it is less evident to show that the result of this research is totally 
contrasts with previous researches. 
Ø There is no correlation between the perception of internal auditors in their role and the perception 
of possibility in detecting fraud. Furthermore, there is no significant difference in the view 
amongst internal auditors who have different perception of their role in connection with detecting 
fraud, about which factors are important in influencing the possibility of detecting fraud.  This is 
not in line with role theory and previous research.    
6.2 Practical implications  
This study gives a valuable insight on the control environment and the possibility of internal auditors 
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in detecting fraud. From this research, organizations can be aware that although internal control 
environment factors are important, it cannot be a significant factor that constrains the possibility of 
internal auditors to detect fraud. In other words, if organizations want to increase the possibility of 
internal auditors in detecting fraud, they should focus on other factors. The result of this research also 
helps organizations in analyzing the failure of internal auditors in detecting fraud in corporate 
scandals. Instead of looking on control environment as a factor that leads to this failure, analyst 
should pay attention to other factors such as independence or competence of internal auditors; it may 
provide more valuable insight when analyzing corporate fraud scandals.  
6.3 Limitations and Future Research 
As other quantitative researches were based on surveys, one limitation of this research is the 
possibility to generalize the results. Since this research is conducted by asking questionnaires to IIA 
members in the US, it could be argued that the results are only for IIA members in US and thus 
cannot be generalized to other internal auditors in US or other internal auditors in a global scale. 
However, the purpose of this research is to find out the insights on the correlation between internal 
control environment and possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud, this result should still be 
viewed as appropriate and valuable regardless of the sample. 
In addition, as other quantitative researches were based on survey, the quality of the survey can be 
influenced by knowledge of the respondent and honesty of the answers. Although this constraint is 
avoided in this research in the way that: (i) the survey is for IIA members in US which assumes that 
they have necessary knowledge and experience in internal audit field so that they are able to answer 
the questions, (ii) the survey treated individual information confidently to encourage respondents 
answered honestly, the quality of the survey may still be somehow influenced by these factors, which, 
in turn, may have influenced the results of this research.  
As mentioned in chapter 5, the question of 5.1 (about the existence of human resource policy) and 
question 7.2 (about the communication of audit committee with management) should be formulated 
in other ways in order to make them more informative and more easy to answer. In addition, it is 
better to use the same likert scale for all questions because it will facilitate the statistics tests.  
Another limitation of the research is the small sample size; this can be shown clearly in the results of 
Chi-square test for hypothesis 2 and 4. Hypothesis 2 and 4 compare how people ranked factors that 
influence the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud by sub-group of internal auditors, the 
sample size needs to be big enough so that each sub-group is large enough to compare. The Chi-
square tests’ result shows that the Chi-square does not provide high statistics confident because of a 
small sample size of each subgroup. Therefore, in this research, Krukal-Wallis is selected instead of 
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Chi-square. The result of Chi-Square can be found in Appendix 5 and 6. 
When conducting the data, one important problem is the correlation between independent factors. The 
high correlation of the data makes the regression test more difficult because it requires handling of this 
problem before running the test or the test will fail. Therefore, it is suggested that when conducting 
research on internal control environment, factors used based on COSO framework are not appropriate due 
to high correlation between them. Therefore, it requires future research with normative approach to find 
factors that can be used to measure internal control environment, which can avoid this high correlation. In 
addition, more quantitative researches using these developed factors by this research should be conducted 
in order to compare their usefulness in comparison with factors developed from COSO framework. 
Finally, items to measure each variable should be developed more in order to have a proper measure for 
each variable; however, this would make the questionnaire too long and people may be reluctant to take 
part in the survey. Due to this reason, this research was reduced to the number of items within each 
variable; this may have influenced the result of the research. 
As discussed in the theoretical implication part, more future research should be conducted to find out 
which factors influence the possibility of internal auditors in detecting fraud; the research area should be 
widen to other factors both objective factors (such as five elements of COSO) and subjective factors (the 
factors related to internal auditors themselves) to overcome the limitation of this research. It would 
provide a better picture of factors influencing the possibility of detecting fraud instead of looking only at 
one COSO element. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix	  1	  –	  Questionnaire  
	  	  
THE	  CONTROL	  ENVIRONMENT	  AND	  INTERNAL	  AUDITORS	  
1. General information 
1.1 How many years of professional experience do you have as an internal auditor? 
❏  Less than 2 years 
❏  More than 2 years and less than 5 years 
❏ More than 5 years and less than 10 years  
❏  More than 10 years 
 
1.2 In your opinion, how important are the task listed below to your internal audit department? Please 
rank the following tasks from 1-6 where 6 is the most important and 1 is the least important.  
❏ Evaluate the adequacy of the system of internal controls 
❏ Detect fraud within the organization 
❏ Recommend improvement to internal controls system 
❏ Assess compliance with policies, procedures, and regulations 
❏ Review business operations to ascertain whether results are consistent with established business 
objectives and whether the operations are being carried out as planned. 
❏ Support the external audit process  
 
2. Perception of probability in detecting fraud 
2.1 What do you think it is the probability of your department detecting fraud in comparison with 
internal auditors in other organizations within the same industry? 
❏ Higher probability 
❏ About the same probability 
❏ Lower probability 
 
2.2 In your perception, what is the probability that your department will detect existing fraud within the 
next year? 
❏ 0-25%  
❏ 26-50% 
❏ 51-75% 
❏ 76-100% 
 
2.3 In your opinion, how has the probability of your department to detect fraud changed during the last 5 
years? 
❏  The probability of detecting fraud has significantly improved 
❏  The probability of detecting fraud has improved 
❏  There has been no change in the probability of detecting fraud 
❏  The probability of detecting fraud has reduced 
❏  The probability of detecting fraud has significantly reduced 
 
3. Top management’s control philosophy and risk appetite 
3.1 In comparison with the average company in the industry, how do you perceive the risk appetite of 
the top management of your organization? 
    ❏Very high risk appetite  
❏ High risk appetite 
❏ Neutral risk appetite 
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❏ Low risk appetite 
❏ Very low risk appetite 
 
3.2 In your perception, how does the top management in your organization prioritize the followings? 
Please rank the following tasks from 1-5 where 5 is the highest priority and 1 is the lowest priority.  
❏ Setting the company's strategy and vision  
❏ Building business culture 
❏ Developing human resource (hiring, firing, etc.,) 
❏ Capital allocation 
❏ Building control system 
 
3.3 What emphasis does top management organization put on control issues? 
❏ Very strong emphasis  
❏ Strong emphasis 
❏ Neutral emphasis 
❏ Very little emphasis 
❏ No emphasis 
 
4. Code of ethics 
4.1 Does your company have a formal code of ethics? 
❏ Yes 
❏ No 
 
4.2 How often are ethical codes reviewed and updated? (if the answer for question 5.1 is No, please 
skip this question) 
❏ At least once a year  
❏ Once within each three-years period 
❏ Once within each five years period 
❏ Once within each more than five years period 
❏ I don’t know 
 
4.3 Please provide your opinion about the following statement: My company has provided me 
adequate guidance on the code of ethics.   
❏ Strongly disagree 
❏ Disagree 
❏ Agree 
❏ Strongly Agree 
❏ I am not aware of code of ethics and its guidance 
 
4.4 What is your opinion on the following statement: If someone participates in unethical behavior, it is 
more likely that it would be detected in my company when compared to the average companies within the 
same industry.  
❏ Strongly disagree  
❏ Disagree 
❏ Neither disagree nor agree  
❏ Agree 
❏ Strongly Agree 
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4.5 What is your opinion on the following statement: If someone participates in unethical behavior, it is 
more likely that it would be penalized in your companies when compared to the average companies 
within the same industry? 
❏ Strongly disagree  
❏ Disagree 
❏ Neither disagree nor agree  
❏ Agree 
❏ Strongly Agree 
 
5. Human Resource Policy 
5.1 Does your organization have a formal human resource policy 
    ❏ Yes 
    ❏ No 
 
5.2 Please provide your opinion about the following statement: the recruitment process of my 
organization is transparent. 
    ❏ Disagree 
    ❏ Somewhat agree  
    ❏ Agree 
    ❏ Mostly Agree 
    ❏ Completely Agree 
 
5.3 Please provide your opinion about the following statement: the promotion process of my organization 
is transparent. 
❏ Disagree 
❏ Somewhat agree  
❏ Agree 
❏ Mostly Agree 
❏ Completely Agree 
 
6. Organizational structure 
 
6.1 In relation to the average companies within the same industry, how would you describe the speed 
of information transferred from managers to employees within your organization? 
   ❏ Very slow  
❏ Somewhat slow 
 ❏ Average 
 ❏ Somewhat fast 
 ❏ Very fast 
  
6.2 In relation to the average companies within the same industry, how would you describe the speed of 
information transferred from employees to managers within your organization? 
 ❏ Very slow  
 ❏ Somewhat slow 
 ❏ Average 
 ❏ Somewhat fast 
 ❏ Very fast 
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 6.3 In relation to the average companies within the same industry, how would you describe the speed of 
information transferred amongst the departments within your organization? 
 ❏ Very slow  
 ❏ Somewhat slow 
 ❏ Average 
 ❏ Somewhat fast 
 ❏ Very fast 
 
7. The Board of Directors oversight 
7.1 How often are meetings between the audit committee and your internal audit department held? 
      ❏  At least once a month 
   ❏    At least once every quarter 
     ❏    At least once every six months 
      ❏    At least once a year 
 
7.2 In your opinion, in comparison with the average company in the industry, how much time does 
the audit committee of your organization spend to communicate with the management? 
 ❏ More time than average in the industry  
 ❏ About the same amount of time as average in the industry 
 ❏ Less time than average in the industry 
 
7.3 In your opinion, does the audit committee in your organization dedicate sufficient time to carry out its 
oversight responsibility?  
 ❏ Disagree  
 ❏ Somewhat agree  
 ❏ Agree 
 ❏ Mostly Agree 
 ❏ Completely Agree 
 
7.4 In your opinion, does the audit committee in your organization have enough expertise to carry out its 
oversight responsibility?  
             ❏ Disagree  
 ❏ Somewhat agree  
 ❏ Agree 
 ❏ Mostly Agree 
 ❏ Completely Agree 
 
8. Overall ranking 
 In your opinion, which of the following factors can influence the difficulty of your department in 
detecting fraud? (Please rate from 5-the most influential factor to 1-the least influential factor). 
❏ Top management risk appetite and control philosophy 
❏ The Board of Directors oversight 
❏ The organization structure 
❏ Code of ethics 
❏ Human resource policy 
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Appendix	  2	  –	  Description	  of	  data  
Frequencies 
Notes 
Output Created 27-MAY-2015 15:31:37 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 143 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid data. 
Syntax 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q2.1 Q2.2 Q2.3 
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE RANGE 
MINIMUM MAXIMUM SEMEAN MEDIAN 
  /HISTOGRAM NORMAL 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.70 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.92 
 
[DataSet1]	  	  
Statistics 
 Q2.1 Q2.2 Q2.3 
N Valid 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0747 .0961 .0735 
Median .000 3.000 4.000 
Std. Deviation .8929 1.1487 .8794 
Variance .797 1.319 .773 
Range 2.0 3.0 4.0 
Minimum .0 1.0 1.0 
Maximum 2.0 4.0 5.0 
 
Frequency Table 
Q2.1 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid .0 87 60.8 60.8 60.8 
1.0 15 10.5 10.5 71.3 
2.0 41 28.7 28.7 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
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Q2.2 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 50 35.0 35.0 35.0 
2.0 17 11.9 11.9 46.9 
3.0 49 34.3 34.3 81.1 
4.0 27 18.9 18.9 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q2.3 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 1 .7 .7 .7 
2.0 10 7.0 7.0 7.7 
3.0 26 18.2 18.2 25.9 
4.0 70 49.0 49.0 74.8 
5.0 36 25.2 25.2 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
Histogram 
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FREQUENCIES	  VARIABLES=Q3.1	  Q3.2	  Q3.3	  
	  	  /STATISTICS=STDDEV	  VARIANCE	  RANGE	  MINIMUM	  MAXIMUM	  SEMEAN	  MEDIAN	  
	  	  /HISTOGRAM	  NORMAL	  
	  	  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.	  
	  
 
Frequencies 
Notes 
Output Created 27-MAY-2015 16:00:19 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 143 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q3.1 
Q3.2 Q3.3 
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE 
RANGE MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
SEMEAN MEDIAN 
  /HISTOGRAM NORMAL 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.41 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.37 
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Statistics 
 Q3.1 Q3.2 Q3.3 
N Valid 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .1144 .0842 .0899 
Median 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation 1.3684 1.0066 1.0752 
Variance 1.873 1.013 1.156 
Range 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Minimum 1.0 1.0 .0 
Maximum 5.0 5.0 4.0 
 
 
 
Frequency Table 
Q3.1 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 20 14.0 14.0 14.0 
2.0 32 22.4 22.4 36.4 
3.0 22 15.4 15.4 51.7 
4.0 39 27.3 27.3 79.0 
5.0 30 21.0 21.0 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
Q3.2 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 19 13.3 13.3 13.3 
2.0 4 2.8 2.8 16.1 
3.0 83 58.0 58.0 74.1 
4.0 28 19.6 19.6 93.7 
5.0 9 6.3 6.3 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
Q3.3 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid .0 1 .7 .7 .7 
1.0 21 14.7 14.7 15.4 
2.0 19 13.3 13.3 28.7 
3.0 49 34.3 34.3 62.9 
4.0 53 37.1 37.1 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
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Histogram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FREQUENCIES	  VARIABLES=Q4.1	  Q4.2	  Q4.3	  Q4.4	  Q4.5	  
	  	  /STATISTICS=STDDEV	  VARIANCE	  RANGE	  MINIMUM	  MAXIMUM	  SEMEAN	  MEDIAN	  
	  	  /HISTOGRAM	  NORMAL	  
	  	  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.	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Frequencies 
Notes 
Output Created 27-MAY-2015 16:07:16 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 143 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q4.1 
Q4.2 Q4.3 Q4.4 Q4.5 
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE 
RANGE MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
SEMEAN MEDIAN 
  /HISTOGRAM NORMAL 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.61 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.59 
 
Statistics 
 Q4.1 Q4.2 Q4.3 Q4.4 Q4.5 
N Valid 143 141 143 143 143 
Missing 0 2 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0138 .116 .1073 .0728 .0841 
Median 1.000 4.00 3.000 4.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation .1655 1.372 1.2826 .8702 1.0055 
Variance .027 1.882 1.645 .757 1.011 
Range 1.0 4 4.0 3.0 4.0 
Minimum .0 1 .0 2.0 1.0 
Maximum 1.0 5 4.0 5.0 5.0 
 
Frequency Table 
Q4.1 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid .0 4 2.8 2.8 2.8 
1.0 139 97.2 97.2 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q4.2 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 20 14.0 14.2 14.2 
2 3 2.1 2.1 16.3 
3 41 28.7 29.1 45.4 
4 25 17.5 17.7 63.1 
5 52 36.4 36.9 100.0 
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Total 141 98.6 100.0  
Missing System 2 1.4   
Total 143 100.0   
 
Q4.3 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid .0 12 8.4 8.4 8.4 
1.0 22 15.4 15.4 23.8 
2.0 16 11.2 11.2 35.0 
3.0 51 35.7 35.7 70.6 
4.0 42 29.4 29.4 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
Q4.4 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2.0 25 17.5 17.5 17.5 
3.0 38 26.6 26.6 44.1 
4.0 69 48.3 48.3 92.3 
5.0 11 7.7 7.7 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q4.5 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 11 7.7 7.7 7.7 
2.0 27 18.9 18.9 26.6 
3.0 56 39.2 39.2 65.7 
4.0 41 28.7 28.7 94.4 
5.0 8 5.6 5.6 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
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Histogram 
 
 
 
	   	  
91	  
	  
 
 
 
FREQUENCIES	  VARIABLES=Q5.2	  Q5.3	  Q5.1	  
	  	  /STATISTICS=STDDEV	  VARIANCE	  RANGE	  MINIMUM	  MAXIMUM	  SEMEAN	  MEDIAN	  
	  	  /HISTOGRAM	  NORMAL	  
	  	  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.	  
 
Frequencies 
 
Notes 
Output Created 27-MAY-2015 16:26:22 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 143 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q5.2 
Q5.3 Q5.1 
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE 
RANGE MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
SEMEAN MEDIAN 
  /HISTOGRAM NORMAL 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.39 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.36 
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Statistics 
 Q5.2 Q5.3 Q5.1 
N Valid 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0743 .0938 .0154 
Median 3.000 3.000 1.000 
Std. Deviation .8889 1.1215 .1843 
Variance .790 1.258 .034 
Range 4.0 4.0 1.0 
Minimum 1.0 1.0 .0 
Maximum 5.0 5.0 1.0 
 
Frequency Table 
Q5.2 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 16 11.2 11.2 11.2 
2.0 36 25.2 25.2 36.4 
3.0 77 53.8 53.8 90.2 
4.0 9 6.3 6.3 96.5 
5.0 5 3.5 3.5 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
Q5.3 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 23 16.1 16.1 16.1 
2.0 30 21.0 21.0 37.1 
3.0 39 27.3 27.3 64.3 
4.0 48 33.6 33.6 97.9 
5.0 3 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q5.1 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid .0 5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
1.0 138 96.5 96.5 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
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Histogram 
 
 
 
FREQUENCIES	  VARIABLES=Q6.1	  Q6.2	  Q6.3	  
	  	  /STATISTICS=STDDEV	  VARIANCE	  RANGE	  MINIMUM	  MAXIMUM	  SEMEAN	  MEDIAN	  
	  	  /HISTOGRAM	  NORMAL	  
	  	  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.	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Frequencies 
Notes 
Output Created 27-MAY-2015 16:29:26 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 143 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q6.1 
Q6.2 Q6.3 
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE 
RANGE MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
SEMEAN MEDIAN 
  /HISTOGRAM NORMAL 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.44 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.44 
 
 
Statistics 
 Q6.1 Q6.2 Q6.3 
N Valid 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0809 .0906 .0780 
Median 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation .9672 1.0833 .9332 
Variance .935 1.173 .871 
Range 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Minimum 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Maximum 5.0 5.0 5.0 
 
 
Frequency Table 
Q6.1 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 12 8.4 8.4 8.4 
2.0 31 21.7 21.7 30.1 
3.0 52 36.4 36.4 66.4 
4.0 46 32.2 32.2 98.6 
5.0 2 1.4 1.4 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q6.2 
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 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 19 13.3 13.3 13.3 
2.0 29 20.3 20.3 33.6 
3.0 47 32.9 32.9 66.4 
4.0 43 30.1 30.1 96.5 
5.0 5 3.5 3.5 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q6.3 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 18 12.6 12.6 12.6 
2.0 31 21.7 21.7 34.3 
3.0 73 51.0 51.0 85.3 
4.0 17 11.9 11.9 97.2 
5.0 4 2.8 2.8 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
 
Histogram 
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FREQUENCIES	  VARIABLES=Q7.1	  Q7.2	  Q7.3	  Q7.4	  
	  	  /STATISTICS=STDDEV	  VARIANCE	  RANGE	  MINIMUM	  MAXIMUM	  SEMEAN	  MEDIAN	  
	  	  /HISTOGRAM	  NORMAL	  
	  	  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.	  
Frequencies 
Notes 
Output Created 27-MAY-2015 16:31:53 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 143 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with 
valid data. 
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q7.1 
Q7.2 Q7.3 Q7.4 
  /STATISTICS=STDDEV VARIANCE 
RANGE MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
SEMEAN MEDIAN 
  /HISTOGRAM NORMAL 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.53 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.52 
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Statistics 
 Q7.1 Q7.2 Q7.3 Q7.4 
N Valid 143 143 143 143 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Std. Error of Mean .0621 .0450 .0685 .0740 
Median 3.000 1.000 3.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation .7421 .5381 .8188 .8853 
Variance .551 .290 .670 .784 
Range 3.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 
Minimum 1.0 .0 1.0 1.0 
Maximum 4.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 
 
 
Frequency Table 
Q7.1 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 6 4.2 4.2 4.2 
2.0 14 9.8 9.8 14.0 
3.0 81 56.6 56.6 70.6 
4.0 42 29.4 29.4 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q7.2 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid .0 9 6.3 6.3 6.3 
1.0 96 67.1 67.1 73.4 
2.0 38 26.6 26.6 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Q7.3 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 4 2.8 2.8 2.8 
2.0 41 28.7 28.7 31.5 
3.0 75 52.4 52.4 83.9 
4.0 17 11.9 11.9 95.8 
5.0 6 4.2 4.2 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
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Q7.4 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1.0 4 2.8 2.8 2.8 
2.0 23 16.1 16.1 18.9 
3.0 73 51.0 51.0 69.9 
4.0 32 22.4 22.4 92.3 
5.0 11 7.7 7.7 100.0 
Total 143 100.0 100.0  
 
Histogram 
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Appendix	  3	  –	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	   
Reliability 
Notes 
Output Created 17-MAY-2015 00:16:19 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 143 
Matrix Input  
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid data 
for all variables in the procedure. 
Syntax RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q2.1 Q2.2 Q2.3 
  /SCALE('2.1-2.3') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.00 
 
[DataSet1]  
 
Scale: 2.1-2.3 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.692 .688 3 
 
 
 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q3.1 Q3.2 Q3.3 
  /SCALE('3.1-3.3') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 143 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 143 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
 Q2.1 .678 .8929 143 
Q2.2 2.371 1.1487 143 
Q2.3 3.909 .8794 143 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 Q2.1 Q2.2 Q2.3 
Q2.1 1.000 .522 .249 
Q2.2 .522 1.000 .501 
Q2.3 .249 .501 1.000 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Q2.1 6.280 3.104 .465 .273 .652 
Q2.2 4.587 1.962 .647 .419 .399 
Q2.3 3.049 3.188 .447 .251 .672 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
6.958 5.364 2.3161 3 
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Reliability 
Notes 
Output Created 17-MAY-2015 00:16:49 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 143 
Matrix Input  
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all 
variables in the procedure. 
Syntax 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q3.1 Q3.2 Q3.3 
  /SCALE('3.1-3.3') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.02 
Scale: 3.1-3.3 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.676 .685 3 
 
 
 
 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q4.1 Q4.2 Q4.3 Q4.4 Q4.5 
  /SCALE('4.1-4.5') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
 
 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 143 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 143 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Q3.1 3.189 1.3684 143 
Q3.2 3.028 1.0066 143 
Q3.3 2.923 1.0752 143 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 Q3.1 Q3.2 Q3.3 
Q3.1 1.000 .211 .599 
Q3.2 .211 1.000 .451 
Q3.3 .599 .451 1.000 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Q3.1 5.951 3.145 .483 .363 .621 
Q3.2 6.112 4.790 .353 .209 .736 
Q3.3 6.217 3.467 .684 .469 .335 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
9.140 7.361 2.7130 3 
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Reliability 
 
Notes 
Output Created 17-MAY-2015 00:17:39 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 143 
Matrix Input  
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing 
User-defined missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid data for all 
variables in the procedure. 
Syntax RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q4.1 Q4.2 Q4.3 Q4.4 Q4.5 
  /SCALE('4.1-4.5') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.00 
 
Scale: 4.1-4.5 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 141 98.6 
Excludeda 2 1.4 
Total 143 100.0 
 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.673 .568 5 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Q4.1 .986 .1187 141 
Q4.2 3.610 1.3720 141 
Q4.3 2.638 1.2721 141 
Q4.4 3.454 .8740 141 
Q4.5 3.043 1.0062 141 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 Q4.1 Q4.2 Q4.3 Q4.4 Q4.5 
Q4.1 1.000 -.034 .108 -.213 -.234 
Q4.2 -.034 1.000 .537 .405 .183 
Q4.3 .108 .537 1.000 .303 .509 
Q4.4 -.213 .405 .303 1.000 .522 
Q4.5 -.234 .183 .509 .522 1.000 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Q4.1 12.745 11.520 -.098 .151 .723 
Q4.2 10.121 6.235 .487 .421 .604 
Q4.3 11.092 5.956 .625 .526 .511 
Q4.4 10.277 8.173 .504 .395 .595 
Q4.5 10.688 7.773 .476 .505 .599 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
13.730 11.455 3.3846 5 
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RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q5.1 Q5.2 Q5.3 
  /SCALE('5.1-5.3') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
 
Reliability 
 
Notes 
Output Created 17-MAY-2015 00:18:15 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 143 
Matrix Input  
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid data 
for all variables in the procedure. 
Syntax RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q5.1 Q5.2 Q5.3 
  /SCALE('5.1-5.3') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.02 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.02 
 
Scale: 5.1-5.3 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 143 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 143 100.0 
 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.527 .282 3 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Q5.1 .965 .1843 143 
Q5.2 2.657 .8889 143 
Q5.3 2.846 1.1215 143 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 Q5.1 Q5.2 Q5.3 
Q5.1 1.000 -.203 -.060 
Q5.2 -.203 1.000 .611 
Q5.3 -.060 .611 1.000 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Q5.1 5.503 3.266 -.137 .047 .746 
Q5.2 3.811 1.267 .575 .401 -.039a 
Q5.3 3.622 .758 .611 .377 -.175a 
 
a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. You 
may want to check item codings. 
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Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
6.469 3.209 1.7912 3 
 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q6.1 Q6.2 Q6.3 
  /SCALE('6.1-6.3') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
 
Reliability 
 
Notes 
Output Created 17-MAY-2015 00:19:02 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 143 
Matrix Input  
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid data 
for all variables in the procedure. 
Syntax RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q6.1 Q6.2 Q6.3 
  /SCALE('6.1-6.3') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.00 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.00 
Scale: 6.1-6.3 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 143 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 143 100.0 
 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.803 .800 3 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Q6.1 2.965 .9672 143 
Q6.2 2.902 1.0833 143 
Q6.3 2.706 .9332 143 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 Q6.1 Q6.2 Q6.3 
Q6.1 1.000 .837 .433 
Q6.2 .837 1.000 .445 
Q6.3 .433 .445 1.000 
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Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Q6.1 5.608 2.944 .764 .705 .611 
Q6.2 5.671 2.588 .761 .709 .604 
Q6.3 5.867 3.863 .459 .210 .908 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
8.573 6.415 2.5329 3 
 
RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q7.1 Q7.2 Q7.3 Q7.4 
  /SCALE('7.1-7.4') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
 
Reliability 
 
Notes 
Output Created 17-MAY-2015 00:19:51 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 143 
Matrix Input  
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid data 
for all variables in the procedure. 
Syntax RELIABILITY 
  /VARIABLES=Q7.1 Q7.2 Q7.3 Q7.4 
  /SCALE('7.1-7.4') ALL 
  /MODEL=ALPHA 
  /STATISTICS=DESCRIPTIVE SCALE CORR 
  /SUMMARY=TOTAL. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.02 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.02 
 
Scale: 7.1-7.4 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N % 
Cases Valid 143 100.0 
Excludeda 0 .0 
Total 143 100.0 
 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
.540 .495 4 
Item Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Q7.1 3.112 .7421 143 
Q7.2 1.203 .5381 143 
Q7.3 2.860 .8188 143 
Q7.4 3.161 .8853 143 
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Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 Q7.1 Q7.2 Q7.3 Q7.4 
Q7.1 1.000 .207 .177 .358 
Q7.2 .207 1.000 -.047 -.099 
Q7.3 .177 -.047 1.000 .585 
Q7.4 .358 -.099 .585 1.000 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 
Scale Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Q7.1 7.224 2.457 .366 .190 .435 
Q7.2 9.133 3.539 .015 .078 .650 
Q7.3 7.476 2.167 .424 .344 .376 
Q7.4 7.175 1.850 .509 .426 .275 
 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
10.336 3.858 1.9643 4 
	  
Appendix	  4	  –	  Regression	  Test	  
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 25-MAY-2015 08:10:12 
Comments  
Input Active Dataset DataSet3 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 143 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing. 
Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with no 
missing values for any variable used. 
Syntax REGRESSION 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R 
ANOVA 
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10) 
  /NOORIGIN 
  /DEPENDENT Y 
  /METHOD=ENTER PC1 PC2 PC3 
PC4 PC5. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.02 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.08 
Memory Required 2692 bytes 
Additional Memory Required 
for Residual Plots 0 bytes 
 
	  
[DataSet3]	  	  
Variables Entered/Removeda 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 PC5, PC4, PC1, 
PC2, PC3b . Enter 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Y 
	   	  
106	  
	  
b. All requested variables entered. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .155a .024 -.012 .776552391149 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), PC5, PC4, PC1, PC2, PC3 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.023 5 .405 .671 .646b 
Residual 82.616 137 .603   
Total 84.639 142    
 
a. Dependent Variable: Y 
b. Predictors: (Constant), PC5, PC4, PC1, PC2, PC3 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 2.288 .074  30.997 .000 
PC1 .028 .048 .052 .583 .561 
PC2 .026 .057 .041 .464 .643 
PC3 -.020 .053 -.035 -.382 .703 
PC4 .086 .050 .151 1.728 .086 
PC5 .012 .060 .018 .196 .845 
 
a. Dependent Variable: Y 
	  
Appendix	  5	  –	  CROSSTAB,	  Chi-­‐square	  for	  hypothesis	  2 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Yrs of experience * Top 
management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 
143 100.0% 0 0.0% 143 100.0% 
Yrs of experience * Code of ethics 143 100.0% 0 0.0% 143 100.0% 
Yrs of experience * Human 
resource policy 143 100.0% 0 0.0% 143 100.0% 
Yrs of experience * The 
organization structure 143 100.0% 0 0.0% 143 100.0% 
Yrs of experience * The Board of 
Directors oversight 143 100.0% 0 0.0% 143 100.0% 
 
Yrs of experience * Top management risk appetite and control philosophy 
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Crosstab 
 
Top management risk appetite and control philosophy 
1 2 3 4 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 4 6 1 2 
% within Yrs of experience 23.5% 35.3% 5.9% 11.8% 
% within Top management risk 
appetite and control philosophy 11.8% 20.7% 5.0% 10.0% 
2 Count 12 5 4 6 
% within Yrs of experience 38.7% 16.1% 12.9% 19.4% 
% within Top management risk 
appetite and control philosophy 35.3% 17.2% 20.0% 30.0% 
3 Count 10 9 9 5 
% within Yrs of experience 21.3% 19.1% 19.1% 10.6% 
% within Top management risk 
appetite and control philosophy 29.4% 31.0% 45.0% 25.0% 
4 Count 8 9 6 7 
% within Yrs of experience 16.7% 18.8% 12.5% 14.6% 
% within Top management risk 
appetite and control philosophy 23.5% 31.0% 30.0% 35.0% 
Total Count 34 29 20 20 
% within Yrs of experience 23.8% 20.3% 14.0% 14.0% 
% within Top management risk 
appetite and control philosophy 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Crosstab 
 
Top management 
risk appetite and 
control philosophy 
Total 5 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 4 17 
% within Yrs of experience 23.5% 100.0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 10.0% 11.9% 
2 Count 4 31 
% within Yrs of experience 12.9% 100.0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 10.0% 21.7% 
3 Count 14 47 
% within Yrs of experience 29.8% 100.0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 35.0% 32.9% 
4 Count 18 48 
% within Yrs of experience 37.5% 100.0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 45.0% 33.6% 
Total Count 40 143 
% within Yrs of experience 28.0% 100.0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 100.0% 100.0% 
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Yrs of experience * Code of ethics 
Crosstab 
 
Code of ethics 
1 2 3 4 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 1 3 3 7 
% within Yrs of 
experience 5.9% 17.6% 17.6% 41.2% 
% within Code of ethics 8.3% 6.0% 15.8% 14.6% 
2 Count 2 8 4 14 
% within Yrs of 
experience 6.5% 25.8% 12.9% 45.2% 
% within Code of ethics 16.7% 16.0% 21.1% 29.2% 
3 Count 7 17 6 12 
% within Yrs of 
experience 14.9% 36.2% 12.8% 25.5% 
% within Code of ethics 58.3% 34.0% 31.6% 25.0% 
4 Count 2 22 6 15 
% within Yrs of 
experience 4.2% 45.8% 12.5% 31.3% 
% within Code of ethics 16.7% 44.0% 31.6% 31.3% 
Total Count 12 50 19 48 
% within Yrs of 
experience 8.4% 35.0% 13.3% 33.6% 
% within Code of ethics 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Crosstab 
 
Code of ethics 
Total 5 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 3 17 
% within Yrs of experience 17.6% 100.0% 
% within Code of ethics 21.4% 11.9% 
2 Count 3 31 
% within Yrs of experience 9.7% 100.0% 
% within Code of ethics 21.4% 21.7% 
3 Count 5 47 
% within Yrs of experience 10.6% 100.0% 
% within Code of ethics 35.7% 32.9% 
4 Count 3 48 
% within Yrs of experience 6.3% 100.0% 
% within Code of ethics 21.4% 33.6% 
Total Count 14 143 
% within Yrs of experience 9.8% 100.0% 
% within Code of ethics 100.0% 100.0% 
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Yrs of experience * Human resource policy 
 
Crosstab 
 
Human resource policy 
1 2 3 4 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 5 5 1 1 
% within Yrs of experience 29.4% 29.4% 5.9% 5.9% 
% within Human resource policy 10.6% 16.1% 5.6% 6.3% 
2 Count 9 6 3 3 
% within Yrs of experience 29.0% 19.4% 9.7% 9.7% 
% within Human resource policy 19.1% 19.4% 16.7% 18.8% 
3 Count 17 10 7 6 
% within Yrs of experience 36.2% 21.3% 14.9% 12.8% 
% within Human resource policy 36.2% 32.3% 38.9% 37.5% 
4 Count 16 10 7 6 
% within Yrs of experience 33.3% 20.8% 14.6% 12.5% 
% within Human resource policy 34.0% 32.3% 38.9% 37.5% 
Total Count 47 31 18 16 
% within Yrs of experience 32.9% 21.7% 12.6% 11.2% 
% within Human resource policy 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Crosstab 
 
Human resource 
policy 
Total 5 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 5 17 
% within Yrs of experience 29.4% 100.0% 
% within Human resource policy 16.1% 11.9% 
2 Count 10 31 
% within Yrs of experience 32.3% 100.0% 
% within Human resource policy 32.3% 21.7% 
3 Count 7 47 
% within Yrs of experience 14.9% 100.0% 
% within Human resource policy 22.6% 32.9% 
4 Count 9 48 
% within Yrs of experience 18.8% 100.0% 
% within Human resource policy 29.0% 33.6% 
Total Count 31 143 
% within Yrs of experience 21.7% 100.0% 
% within Human resource policy 100.0% 100.0% 
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Yrs of experience * The organization structure 
Crosstab 
 
The organization structure 
1 2 3 4 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 4 2 3 6 
% within Yrs of experience 23.5% 11.8% 17.6% 35.3% 
% within The organization structure 16.7% 12.5% 10.3% 14.0% 
2 Count 4 8 5 6 
% within Yrs of experience 12.9% 25.8% 16.1% 19.4% 
% within The organization structure 16.7% 50.0% 17.2% 14.0% 
3 Count 8 4 9 17 
% within Yrs of experience 17.0% 8.5% 19.1% 36.2% 
% within The organization structure 33.3% 25.0% 31.0% 39.5% 
4 Count 8 2 12 14 
% within Yrs of experience 16.7% 4.2% 25.0% 29.2% 
% within The organization structure 33.3% 12.5% 41.4% 32.6% 
Total Count 24 16 29 43 
% within Yrs of experience 16.8% 11.2% 20.3% 30.1% 
% within The organization structure 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Crosstab 
 
The organization 
structure 
Total 5 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 2 17 
% within Yrs of experience 11.8% 100.0% 
% within The organization structure 6.5% 11.9% 
2 Count 8 31 
% within Yrs of experience 25.8% 100.0% 
% within The organization structure 25.8% 21.7% 
3 Count 9 47 
% within Yrs of experience 19.1% 100.0% 
% within The organization structure 29.0% 32.9% 
4 Count 12 48 
% within Yrs of experience 25.0% 100.0% 
% within The organization structure 38.7% 33.6% 
Total Count 31 143 
% within Yrs of experience 21.7% 100.0% 
% within The organization structure 100.0% 100.0% 
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Yrs of experience * The Board of Directors oversight 
 
Crosstab 
 
The Board of Directors oversight 
1 2 3 4 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 3 1 9 1 
% within Yrs of experience 17.6% 5.9% 52.9% 5.9% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 11.5% 5.9% 15.8% 6.3% 
2 Count 4 4 15 2 
% within Yrs of experience 12.9% 12.9% 48.4% 6.5% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 15.4% 23.5% 26.3% 12.5% 
3 Count 5 7 16 7 
% within Yrs of experience 10.6% 14.9% 34.0% 14.9% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 19.2% 41.2% 28.1% 43.8% 
4 Count 14 5 17 6 
% within Yrs of experience 29.2% 10.4% 35.4% 12.5% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 53.8% 29.4% 29.8% 37.5% 
Total Count 26 17 57 16 
% within Yrs of experience 18.2% 11.9% 39.9% 11.2% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Crosstab 
 
The Board of 
Directors 
oversight 
Total 5 
Yrs of experience 1 Count 3 17 
% within Yrs of experience 17.6% 100.0% 
% within The Board of Directors oversight 11.1% 11.9% 
2 Count 6 31 
% within Yrs of experience 19.4% 100.0% 
% within The Board of Directors oversight 22.2% 21.7% 
3 Count 12 47 
% within Yrs of experience 25.5% 100.0% 
% within The Board of Directors oversight 44.4% 32.9% 
4 Count 6 48 
% within Yrs of experience 12.5% 100.0% 
% within The Board of Directors oversight 22.2% 33.6% 
Total Count 27 143 
% within Yrs of experience 18.9% 100.0% 
% within The Board of Directors oversight 100.0% 100.0% 
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  6	  –	  CROSSTAB,	  Chi-­‐square	  for	  hypothesis	  4	  
	  
Detect fraud within the organization * Top management risk appetite and control philosophy 
 
 
Crosstab 
 
Top management risk appetite and control philosophy 
1 2 3 4 5 
Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 Count 0 0 1 1 2 
% within Detect fraud within 
the organization 0,0% 0,0% 25,0% 25,0% 50,0% 
% within Top management 
risk appetite and control 
philosophy 
0,0% 0,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 
2 Count 5 11 5 2 11 
% within Detect fraud within 
the organization 14,7% 32,4% 14,7% 5,9% 32,4% 
% within Top management 
risk appetite and control 
philosophy 
14,7% 37,9% 25,0% 10,0% 27,5% 
3 Count 13 6 5 7 7 
% within Detect fraud within 
the organization 34,2% 15,8% 13,2% 18,4% 18,4% 
% within Top management 
risk appetite and control 
philosophy 
38,2% 20,7% 25,0% 35,0% 17,5% 
4 Count 7 6 5 4 9 
% within Detect fraud within 
the organization 22,6% 19,4% 16,1% 12,9% 29,0% 
% within Top management 
risk appetite and control 
philosophy 
20,6% 20,7% 25,0% 20,0% 22,5% 
5 Count 2 2 3 3 8 
% within Detect fraud within 
the organization 11,1% 11,1% 16,7% 16,7% 44,4% 
% within Top management 
risk appetite and control 
philosophy 
5,9% 6,9% 15,0% 15,0% 20,0% 
6 Count 7 4 1 3 3 
% within Detect fraud within 
the organization 38,9% 22,2% 5,6% 16,7% 16,7% 
% within Top management 
risk appetite and control 
philosophy 
20,6% 13,8% 5,0% 15,0% 7,5% 
Total Count 34 29 20 20 40 
% within Detect fraud within 
the organization 23,8% 20,3% 14,0% 14,0% 28,0% 
% within Top management 
risk appetite and control 
philosophy 
100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 Total 
Detect fraud within the organization 1 Count 4 
% within Detect fraud within the organization 100,0% 
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% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 2,8% 
2 Count 34 
% within Detect fraud within the organization 100,0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 23,8% 
3 Count 38 
% within Detect fraud within the organization 100,0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 26,6% 
4 Count 31 
% within Detect fraud within the organization 100,0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 21,7% 
5 Count 18 
% within Detect fraud within the organization 100,0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 12,6% 
6 Count 18 
% within Detect fraud within the organization 100,0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 12,6% 
Total Count 143 
% within Detect fraud within the organization 100,0% 
% within Top management risk appetite and 
control philosophy 100,0% 
 
 
 
Detect fraud within the organization * The Board of Directors oversight 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 
The Board of Directors oversight 
1 2 3 
Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 Count 2 0 1 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 50,0% 0,0% 25,0% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 7,7% 0,0% 1,8% 
2 Count 5 4 15 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 14,7% 11,8% 44,1% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 19,2% 23,5% 26,3% 
3 Count 6 5 14 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 15,8% 13,2% 36,8% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 23,1% 29,4% 24,6% 
4 Count 8 3 10 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 25,8% 9,7% 32,3% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 30,8% 17,6% 17,5% 
5 Count 4 3 7 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 22,2% 16,7% 38,9% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 15,4% 17,6% 12,3% 
6 Count 1 2 10 
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% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 5,6% 11,1% 55,6% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 3,8% 11,8% 17,5% 
Total Count 26 17 57 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 18,2% 11,9% 39,9% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 
The Board of Directors oversight 
4 5  
Detect fraud within the organization 1 Count 0 1 4 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 0,0% 25,0% 100,0% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 0,0% 3,7% 2,8% 
2 Count 7 3 34 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 20,6% 8,8% 100,0% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 43,8% 11,1% 23,8% 
3 Count 3 10 38 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 7,9% 26,3% 100,0% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 18,8% 37,0% 26,6% 
4 Count 4 6 31 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 12,9% 19,4% 100,0% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 25,0% 22,2% 21,7% 
5 Count 1 3 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 5,6% 16,7% 100,0% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 6,3% 11,1% 12,6% 
6 Count 1 4 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 5,6% 22,2% 100,0% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 6,3% 14,8% 12,6% 
Total Count 16 27 143 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 11,2% 18,9% 100,0% 
% within The Board of Directors 
oversight 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Detect fraud within the organization * The organization structure 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 
The organization structure 
1 2 3 
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Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 Count 0 0 0 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
% within The organization structure 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
2 Count 7 2 7 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 20,6% 5,9% 20,6% 
% within The organization structure 29,2% 12,5% 24,1% 
3 Count 7 7 6 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 18,4% 18,4% 15,8% 
% within The organization structure 29,2% 43,8% 20,7% 
4 Count 4 3 5 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 12,9% 9,7% 16,1% 
% within The organization structure 16,7% 18,8% 17,2% 
5 Count 4 1 6 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 22,2% 5,6% 33,3% 
% within The organization structure 16,7% 6,3% 20,7% 
6 Count 2 3 5 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 11,1% 16,7% 27,8% 
% within The organization structure 8,3% 18,8% 17,2% 
Total Count 24 16 29 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 16,8% 11,2% 20,3% 
% within The organization structure 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
Crosstab 
 
The organization structure 
4 5  
Detect fraud within the organization 1 Count 3 1 4 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 75,0% 25,0% 100,0% 
% within The organization structure 7,0% 3,2% 2,8% 
2 Count 12 6 34 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 35,3% 17,6% 100,0% 
% within The organization structure 27,9% 19,4% 23,8% 
3 Count 10 8 38 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 26,3% 21,1% 100,0% 
% within The organization structure 23,3% 25,8% 26,6% 
4 Count 10 9 31 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 32,3% 29,0% 100,0% 
% within The organization structure 23,3% 29,0% 21,7% 
5 Count 3 4 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 16,7% 22,2% 100,0% 
% within The organization structure 7,0% 12,9% 12,6% 
6 Count 5 3 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 27,8% 16,7% 100,0% 
% within The organization structure 11,6% 9,7% 12,6% 
Total Count 43 31 143 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 30,1% 21,7% 100,0% 
% within The organization structure 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
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Detect fraud within the organization * Code of ethics 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 
Code of ethics 
1 2 3 
Detect fraud within the 
organization 
1 Count 1 2 1 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 25,0% 50,0% 25,0% 
% within Code of ethics 8,3% 4,0% 5,3% 
2 Count 4 11 3 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 11,8% 32,4% 8,8% 
% within Code of ethics 33,3% 22,0% 15,8% 
3 Count 2 11 8 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 5,3% 28,9% 21,1% 
% within Code of ethics 16,7% 22,0% 42,1% 
4 Count 3 11 4 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 9,7% 35,5% 12,9% 
% within Code of ethics 25,0% 22,0% 21,1% 
5 Count 1 8 2 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 5,6% 44,4% 11,1% 
% within Code of ethics 8,3% 16,0% 10,5% 
6 Count 1 7 1 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 5,6% 38,9% 5,6% 
% within Code of ethics 8,3% 14,0% 5,3% 
Total Count 12 50 19 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 8,4% 35,0% 13,3% 
% within Code of ethics 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 
Code of ethics 
4 5  
Detect fraud within the organization 1 Count 0 0 4 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
% within Code of ethics 0,0% 0,0% 2,8% 
2 Count 10 6 34 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 29,4% 17,6% 100,0% 
% within Code of ethics 20,8% 42,9% 23,8% 
3 Count 14 3 38 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 36,8% 7,9% 100,0% 
% within Code of ethics 29,2% 21,4% 26,6% 
4 Count 11 2 31 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 35,5% 6,5% 100,0% 
% within Code of ethics 22,9% 14,3% 21,7% 
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5 Count 7 0 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 38,9% 0,0% 100,0% 
% within Code of ethics 14,6% 0,0% 12,6% 
6 Count 6 3 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 33,3% 16,7% 100,0% 
% within Code of ethics 12,5% 21,4% 12,6% 
Total Count 48 14 143 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 33,6% 9,8% 100,0% 
% within Code of ethics 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
Detect fraud within the organization * Human resource policy 
Crosstab 
 
Human resource policy 
1 2 3 
Detect fraud within 
the organization 
1 Count 1 2 1 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 25,0% 50,0% 25,0% 
% within Human resource policy 2,1% 6,5% 5,6% 
2 Count 13 6 4 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 38,2% 17,6% 11,8% 
% within Human resource policy 27,7% 19,4% 22,2% 
3 Count 10 9 5 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 26,3% 23,7% 13,2% 
% within Human resource policy 21,3% 29,0% 27,8% 
4 Count 9 8 7 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 29,0% 25,8% 22,6% 
% within Human resource policy 19,1% 25,8% 38,9% 
5 Count 7 4 0 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 38,9% 22,2% 0,0% 
% within Human resource policy 14,9% 12,9% 0,0% 
6 Count 7 2 1 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 38,9% 11,1% 5,6% 
% within Human resource policy 14,9% 6,5% 5,6% 
Total Count 47 31 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 32,9% 21,7% 12,6% 
% within Human resource policy 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crosstab 
 
Human resource policy 
4 5  
Detect fraud within the organization 1 Count 0 0 4 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 0,0% 0,0% 100,0% 
% within Human resource policy 0,0% 0,0% 2,8% 
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2 Count 3 8 34 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 8,8% 23,5% 100,0% 
% within Human resource policy 18,8% 25,8% 23,8% 
3 Count 4 10 38 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 10,5% 26,3% 100,0% 
% within Human resource policy 25,0% 32,3% 26,6% 
4 Count 2 5 31 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 6,5% 16,1% 100,0% 
% within Human resource policy 12,5% 16,1% 21,7% 
5 Count 4 3 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 22,2% 16,7% 100,0% 
% within Human resource policy 25,0% 9,7% 12,6% 
6 Count 3 5 18 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 16,7% 27,8% 100,0% 
% within Human resource policy 18,8% 16,1% 12,6% 
Total Count 16 31 143 
% within Detect fraud within the 
organization 11,2% 21,7% 100,0% 
% within Human resource policy 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 
 
	  
